Disruption Has Come to Shipping

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Only if I had a penny every time I had to spell out these terms to a financier dealing with commercial terms for the delivery of a vessel. It sounds almost like gibberish, but for those in the knowing, these are very clear terms and have saved many a shipowner or charterer from undue legal headaches. (For more shipping abbreviations, please see our S&P blog here!) These abbreviations are standard language and stand for All Going Well / Weather Permitting / Unforeseen Circumstances All Exempted / With Out Guarantee. They are the remnant of past reality, when Telex was the primary way of communicating commercial information in a time sensitive manner, and, text transmitted was charged by the number of the charterers consisting it. Really.

This was a time when people had to economize with their words due to technical and accordingly economic considerations. Had to be succinct since additional characters cost money; then, the telefax replaced the telex and transmitting was charged by the page, and eventually email has become the prominent way of transmitting information, which effective is free (besides a nominal monthly fixed cost for the connection). For those nostalgic of telex, Twitter had set a limit of 140 characters (now 280), but this was for other than economical considerations. And, the 280-character limit, Twitter does not stop someone for blabbing all they want; again for free.

The Internet has been changing the way the shipping industry is functioning. For starters, business has become much more transparent and efficient, and so far has affected the economics of auxiliary services such as ship-brokerage, charter brokerage, supplies and victualing, etc It has also affected documentation and certification for statutory and regulatory inspections, maintenance, communications, cargo and commercial documents, etc And, in the next phase of technology, the actual operations, management and trading of the ships are coming into focus.

When the Internet was “invented” in the 1990s and for the “dot com” mania, technology was still a novelty; too bulky and still very expensive in terms of computers and computer code, and, quite frankly, shipping was not the ideal industry for B2B (business-to-business) applications to start with. Two decades onwards, the cost of technology has come dramatically down, there are many app developers knowledgeable with new platforms, and more importantly, there has been a universal push to employ technology for both substituting for routine business and mainly “dig data” for making informed decisions. In the last decade, technology has had only an evolutionary impact on the shipping industry; however, looking forward, the impact can become revolutionary, or as they say, “disruptive”, in the sense it can disrupt existing industries from doing business “as always have been done”. Disruptive technologies effective force established industries to do business on a new set of economics and market drivers: physically hailing a taxi but now booking car service via an app (known standards of safety, security, timing, pricing, service, etc, with possibly automated cars in the future) is one of the most simplistic ways for one to understand “disruption”.

The impact of technology so far has been subdued and only limited to certain, well defined areas such as automation, digitization, etc It has just been complimentary to the industry by providing efficiencies and cutting costs, sometimes at the expense of shifting business models for a few complimentary service industries. However, looking forward, it seems we are almost of the cusp of major paradigm shifts that can change the market. For instance, brokerage – whether S&P and chartering – could be completely substituted by online platforms. What would stop a charterer from posting their business online and then get to choose the best bidder (ship) at the optimal price? What would stop a shipowner from posting their ship online for sale once the decision is made to divest of the asset? All these are commoditized products (cargoes, routes, ships, etc) and once a platform attracts critical mass, the market becomes much more efficient. And, execution of contract on an online platform, is just a formality.

As ships and cargoes getting connected, “Internet of Things” (IoT) can help with more efficient transport and optimizing the supply chain (translating to lower shrinkage, pilferage, spoilage, etc and of course lower financing trade costs). IoT can help from preventive maintenance onboard ships to minimizing to cost of repairs, but mainly can lead to automation of shipping and effectively to man-less ships. If airplanes with human cargo can be trusted on auto-pilots for most of the flight, it’s hard to see what would stop ships from navigating the seas on their own. And, one step further, “big data” and artificial intelligence can allow for predictive analysis of business trends and expected cargo movements. Probably, all these sound like a sci-fi scenarios with a remote hope of application. Instead of a counter-argument, one has to pay attention to a modern automobile and try to draw similarities to shipping. If a highly regulated and fragmented industry (automakers) with a much higher degree of human interaction can see their way to driver-less cars, it would not be too hard for ships to follow. Naval engineering remained a “bulk” and material-heavy discipline for the last several decades, just like cars used to be at Detroit’s glory days; however, a shift to more intellectual power is seems to be coming.

Ships are very expensive assets and often industry players prefer to stick with what it’s known and proven rather than take un-necessary risks; it’s an applaudable approach, but again, there is a paradigm shift when one has to jump into the future. Imaging being the last shipowner who built the last clipper ship only to see the steam engine cannibalizing the market. Change will come irrespective of the hesitancy by shipowners because other industries and companies from other industries will force their way on shipping. It is estimated that one-fifth of the containerized cargo moves on account of Walmart. While Walmart has taken a more cavalier approach to transport, Amazon has been much more aggressive and technology savvy. While at earlier stages, Amazon was completely dependent on UPS and FedEx for their shipments, now they building their own fleet of cargo planes and vehicles and hiring people for deliveries, just a step before deliveries with drones. It’s only a matter of time before Amazon will start shaking the containerized shipping industry. Would one think that other bulk commodity owners such as Vale, etc will not play the game?

Disrupted long time ago… Image credit: Karatzas Images


© 2013 – present Basil M Karatzas & Karatzas Marine Advisors & Co.  All Rights Reserved.

IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER:  Access to this blog signifies the reader’s irrevocable acceptance of this disclaimer. No part of this blog can be reproduced by any means and under any circumstances, whatsoever, in whole or in part, without proper attribution or the consent of the copyright and trademark holders of this website. Whilst every effort has been made to ensure that information here within has been received from sources believed to be reliable and such information is believed to be accurate at the time of publishing, no warranties or assurances whatsoever are made in reference to accuracy or completeness of said information, and no liability whatsoever will be accepted for taking or failing to take any action upon any information contained in any part of this website.  Thank you for the consideration.

 

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Karatzas Marine Advisors & Co. to Host Shipping Finance Conference in Athens, Greece

Karatzas Marine Advisors & Co Proudly Hosts the Shipping Finance Conference 2018 in Athens, Greece, on February 22nd,  in co-operation with Slide2Open and Boussias Communications.

Please join a group of high caliber speakers and thought leaders in the maritime industry discussing the current state of the shipping industry, the challenges and opportunities looking forward, in presentations, panel discussions and Q&A sessions in modules ranging from shipping finance and investment opportunities to disruptive technologies and e-commerce in shipping and related industries. This will the first conference in this agenda-setting must-attend series of events on shipping and shipping finance to  be hosted by Karatzas Marine Advisors & Co and their business associates.

We are looking forward seeing you in Athens on February 22nd, 2018!


© 2013 – present Basil M Karatzas & Karatzas Marine Advisors & Co.  All Rights Reserved.

IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER:  Access to this blog signifies the reader’s irrevocable acceptance of this disclaimer. No part of this blog can be reproduced by any means and under any circumstances, whatsoever, in whole or in part, without proper attribution or the consent of the copyright and trademark holders of this website. Whilst every effort has been made to ensure that information here within has been received from sources believed to be reliable and such information is believed to be accurate at the time of publishing, no warranties or assurances whatsoever are made in reference to accuracy or completeness of said information, and no liability whatsoever will be accepted for taking or failing to take any action upon any information contained in any part of this website.  Thank you for the consideration.

For the Shipping Industry, a Matter of Interest and Indebtedness

Ever since shipping banks (and banks in other industries) have been curtailing their lending to shipowners (and for other banks outside shipping to small and middle-market companies), there has been a big funding gap, a market need, that has to be filled for the economy to grow. Many credit funds or alternative capital funds have popped in shipping that lend money for those who look for financing to buy or refinance ships. On a broader scale, many brand-name private equity funds have been setting up credit funds in order to serve the market need of lack of debt financing in numerous industries; with more regulation for banks (among other things), un-regulated lenders step in to serve the market.

There are substantial differences in the way a bank evaluates a loan in shipping than a credit funds approaches the market; although effectively they both look to undertake credit risk (they both lend money), there are always more types of risk entangled around credit: asset risk, operational risk, counterparty risk, etc No doubt that credit funds, as non-regulated lenders typically, have much more flexibility of the structures and the terms of the loans they can underwrite. For starters, credit funds can also take a little or a lot of residual asset risk (balloon payments, etc), market risk (profit sharing, etc), asset risk (finance older vessels, etc), that is, they can think outside the “credit risk” box and provide commercially more flexible structures (of course, at a higher cost of capital.) Also, since credit funds are not regulated, when there is a default of a loan, there is no reporting to a regulatory body which would have consequences on ratios and strategy; a credit fund would have the precious luxury to convert late payments to equity or accept payment-in-kind (PIK) or impose a higher profit sharing scheme and eventually take over the asset, if things really go bad. To be sure, a default for a loan is a painful experience for all those involved, for the shipowner / borrower of course, and also for the financier / creditor, whether the creditor is a regulated bank or a credit fund as practically no-one wishes for such an outcome of default (unless the lender is really a niche vulture fund specializing on feeding on carcasses and liquidation, but honestly, this is the exception than the rule.)

The typical credit fund these days would charge approximately 8% interest for a first preferred ship mortgage; for some, this is expressed as annual interest in absolute terms, but for others, it’s the spread over Libor (L+800 bps), meaning that the borrower also undertakes interest rate risk (at a time when the Fed and other central banks shifting to a tightening mode.) The amount of leverage is dependable, but most likely it populates in the 60-70% range, inlying that still a respectable percentage of equity is required; of course, more equity means that the shipowner has to be selective with their projects and also that the credit risk for the creditor goes down as the percentage of equity goes up. Although some credit funds can accept a bullet payment of the principal (under certain circumstances), a certain level of amortization is required for most cases. And, there are the usual assignment of earnings, minimum value clause, minimum liquidity clause, negative covenant clauses, and also pledge of shares, undated signed director resignations, and, more frequently these days, demands for a personal or corporate guarantee. All in all, the loan terms these days seem to be the extreme opposite of the easy credit days of a decade ago of name lending and loans agreed on a handshake.

Although a few short years ago shipowners would never had conceded to a first preferred ship mortgage with an interest rate above 4-5% or other funky terms, these days there are few options, and thus the reason that 8% has become the prevailing cost of the debt for ship mortgages. Different types, different norms, as said before.

For a theoretical example of a five-year modern panamax bulker valued at $22 mil and 65% leverage and five year term, at 8% annual interest, the daily interest payment alone is appr. $3,000 per diem; presuming that there is a requirement for the principal to be amortized by 50% over the term of the facility, then another $4,000 pd had to be added to the financing payments. Based on a back-of-the-envelope assumption of $6,500 pd vessel daily operating expenses, the cash expenses for operating such a ship range from $9,500 – $13,500 pd; just as a reminder, only in the last eight months panamax freight rates sustainably moved above $10,000 pd, meaning that many borrowers, at best, they were breaking even in the last eighteen months. Of course, there is the hope for higher asset prices and higher freight rates, but, as they say, hope does not make for a good business plan. This model of 8% cost of debt financing would never work with modern, expensive ships (as the interest payment would become exorbitant in today’s freight market), while older tonnage (to the extent that a credit fund can be enticed enough to consider it) has more favorable economics.

There are a few corollaries to the prevailing market practices that need come elaboration:

  1. the cost of debt financing has moved to such high levels that it’s barely economically feasible to undertake new projects or buy ships for the smaller, independent shipowner
  2. borrowers undertake severe interest rate risk at a time when interest rates are moving higher (unlike a shipping bank with its interest rate swap desk that offered a full package, credit funds do not offer such service, and the borrower has to search a dis-incentivized market for this product for effectively project finance and small amounts)
  3. there is a lot of risk for both the borrower and the creditor under such scenario of high interest rates, and it will not take much for many of these financing projects to be underwater, so to speak
  4. as several more tight covenants have been added to these types of loans, in the event of defaults, it can be really ugly; if the overall market turns south (an unlikely scenario for now, but as we have learned, in shipping even unlikely scenarios are probable), there will be a massive cascading problem (credit funds will not be as cavalier as shipping banks with arresting ships, but then how they would be operating them or sell them in a declining market?)
  5. with so many credit funds having been set up for shipping, potentially there could be the possibility of them having to compete and lowering their standards in order to gain business; we are well aware of at least one credit fund that between April and October 2016 made a complete U-turn on their credit underwriting as they could not get one deal done.
  6. as cost of debt financing is too high, many financial sources keep looking entering the market which likely would undermine the credit fund market; we are working with a Chinese-originating fund providing first preferred ship mortgages at 5% interest for 50-60% leverage and very normalized covenants.
  7. disappointedly, for credit funds being private equity funds and well versed in structured finance, their proposed structures are extremely monolithic and inflexible, which will cost them a lot over the long term; being unregulated and flexible, only imagination could limit structures where they could make big returns if they were willing to be flexible and exchange some credit risk for some market risk and some asset risk and some residual risk and some counterparty risk and some… All credit funds have been pigeon-holed into credit, they compete heads-one with every other credit fund, and the only reason they do business now is that shipping is desperate for capital; this market could easily move away. But again, most of these credit funds have been run by former shipping bankers with some trying to exonerate themselves for the shipping bank mistakes of the last decade…

For now for sure, shipping debt is an interest-ing market to watch…

For some, a foggy market… One World Trade Center in Downtown Manhattan. Image credit: Karatzas Images

© 2013 – present Basil M Karatzas & Karatzas Marine Advisors & Co.  All Rights Reserved.

IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER:  Access to this blog signifies the reader’s irrevocable acceptance of this disclaimer. No part of this blog can be reproduced by any means and under any circumstances, whatsoever, in whole or in part, without proper attribution or the consent of the copyright and trademark holders of this website. Whilst every effort has been made to ensure that information here within has been received from sources believed to be reliable and such information is believed to be accurate at the time of publishing, no warranties or assurances whatsoever are made in reference to accuracy or completeness of said information, and no liability whatsoever will be accepted for taking or failing to take any action upon any information contained in any part of this website.  Thank you for the consideration.

Shipping’s Best Hope of Forgettable Years

By all accounts, 2017 was a forgettable year for shipping – which it may be the best characterization the industry could possibly have at present. Recent memorable years in shipping have not been very uplifting. Probably many people in the industry are still struggling to forget 2016 and its 296 BDI and 161 Capesize readings in March of that year, the lowest ever readings by the Baltic Exchange.

2017 was rather good for dry bulk (pleasantly great if one opts to compare it to an abysmal 2016) while tankers, containerships and offshore were mildly disappointing markets. Shipping segments are not often in sync with each other and segment gyrations are to be expected. Although the fundamentals driving each segment differ nominally, there have been a few common underlying trends across segments at present: the outstanding orderbook has been low in each and every segment, actually the lowest in recent memory. Tonnage demand keeps increasing on the strength of global economic growth. Tonnage supply keeps growing but at lower levels, so much so that tonnage demand hesitantly exceeds tonnage supply growth in certain markets. And, lack of shipping finance negatively affects all segments of the industry, further curtailing the possibility for an exorbitant wave of newbuildings. When one examines shipping closely, as a pure tonnage supply and demand equilibrium, 2018 and the near future seem rather promising.

However, shipping is an industry known to get people by surprise and looking forward there are reasons for a market participant to be concerned. Several factors, complimentary to the industry, are cause for concern; probably not as bad as to make the proverbial list “what keep’s you awake at night” but again, not an era of assured smooth sailing.

The shipping finance market has been dysfunctional for the last few years, but at present, the dislocation in the market is reaching unprecedented levels. As traditional shipping banks keep leaving the industry and institutional investors have lost any interest in private equity investments and some public market investments as well, the cost of capital keeps increasing steadily. It’s not unheard of for independent shipowners to be borrowing at 8% spread for first preferred ship mortgages with tight covenants and terms these days. For a capital intensive industry, the high cost of capital is an accident waiting to happen for shipowners and financiers alike. Also, lack of debt financing is shifting the market, even forcing smaller players to shut down and slowly driving a consolidation wave. Probably too soon to notice any immediate effect in 2018, but watching the Greek and German markets over the last few years, one can note the trend forming.

Many hopeful shipping business plans and corporate presentations pride on the industry’s low outstanding orderbook. It’s absolutely marvelous that shipowners have shown self-discipline in the last few years and abstained from speculative orders; however, the counter-argument is that shipbuilders are immediately ready for new orders and can deliver new ships as soon as within nine months. Low outstanding orderbook implies plenty of spare shipbuilding capacity. And, while there has been talk about inconsequential Chinese shipbuilders getting weeded out in the last couple of years, the truth of the matter is that shipbuilding capacity is highly elastic and all those now defunct shipbuilders would be entering again the market the minute that hot new orders start arriving. It’s a good thing that institutional investors and shipowners have lost interest in “speculative” newbuilding orders, but a strong freight market could likely incite many new orders that can start flooding the market very soon and thwarting a full market recovery. Barring an exogenous stimulus such as export credit incentives or materially lower newbuilding contract prices, a “forgettable” and un-inspiring freight market may be the safest way of navigating these narrow shoals.

While when talking about shipping the focus is on freight rates and asset prices, one cannot neglect the regulatory and operational nature of the business. The ballast water treatment management plants (BWMS) have already been costing the industry additional capital, and new emissions regulations are fast afoot. New regulations are costing the industry billions of dollars when the industry can poorly afford them, and one would expect even tighter standards going forward. Higher standards for vessel performance, tighter standards for safety and security, likely soon IT security to make ships relatively secure from hacking and ransomware, and all these, before one takes into consideration technological obsolescence factors: if for instance natural gas bunkering is the way of the future, what would happen to today’s modern world fleet? We do not want to be the Cassandras and the pessimists of the business, but one has to think about the long future very hard when ordering vessels that have twenty-five years of design life.

Further, while the vessels themselves can be the subject to higher standards and technological obsolesce, how about the cargoes and the underlying trading trends themselves? The cost of producing solar and wind energy has been dropping precipitously and jeopardizing the importance of coal, and possibly crude oil, as the world’s primary energy sources. Electric cars have slowly been passing the “novelty” phase of new products and becoming mainstream that would further impact the energy transport market. And, as shale oil and natural gas keeps improving lowering its production cost, likely to be less need for transport. Probably an isolated example, but the current polar wave of freezing weather in North America barely registered on the crude tanker market; there was a time when crude tanker rates were shooting skywards as charterers were scrambling to import more oil to the US to cover increased energy demand every time there was a cold front in North America. Energy trends take a long time to materialize, but on the other hand, one cannot dismiss that a new baseline that’s forming for the immediate and distant future.

We do not want to be pessimists and do not want to be the ones who are pointing to a half-empty glass. 2017 has been a respectable year, and, with a bit of good luck, 2018 would be equally fair. After many years of persistent fireworks in the industry, some “forgettable” years would be a welcome change. But just like navigating in unchartered waters, one has to keep paying attention to the dangers lurking in the ambient environment and under the surface of the sea.

A Happy New Year to all, especially the seafarers in the middle of the ocean an away from their families!

Happy Shipping and Happy New Year! Virginia Beach, VA. Image credit: Karatzas Images


An edited version of this article first appeared on Splash 24/7 on January 3rd, 2018, under the heading “A forgettable year is our best option”.


© 2013 – present Basil M Karatzas & Karatzas Marine Advisors & Co.  All Rights Reserved.

IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER:  Access to this blog signifies the reader’s irrevocable acceptance of this disclaimer. No part of this blog can be reproduced by any means and under any circumstances, whatsoever, in whole or in part, without proper attribution or the consent of the copyright and trademark holders of this website. Whilst every effort has been made to ensure that information here within has been received from sources believed to be reliable and such information is believed to be accurate at the time of publishing, no warranties or assurances whatsoever are made in reference to accuracy or completeness of said information, and no liability whatsoever will be accepted for taking or failing to take any action upon any information contained in any part of this website.  Thank you for the consideration.

Topical Insight and Current Developments in the Maritime Industry

Basil M Karatzas and Karatzas Marine Advisors Quoted in the News

We are delighted that Karatzas Marine Advisors & Co. and its founder Basil M. Karatzas have been the trusted and insightful source of market knowledge and intelligence for all things maritime; with prompt and accurate access to market information, a vast network of resources and paramount access to senior executives worldwide, in the shipping and complimentary industries, the company and its founding partner have had a front row seat to today’s developments in the maritime industry.

We always thought that we have had a strong advantage over the competition and nothing gives us higher pleasure than seeing our expertise appreciated beyond a constant deal-flow and boardroom discussions with our clients, and in the pages and the trust of the international business press.

Recent media quotations for Basil M Karatzas & Karatzas Marine Advisors:

– China, Flush With Cash, Sets Sights on Shipping, The Wall Street Journal, December 23rd, 2017                                                                                                       On Chinese leasing and Chinese financing going aggressively after the international shipping finance market where western banks are retreating                                                                                                                                                                                           – Euronav to Buy Gener8 to Create Oil-Tanker Giant, The Wall Street Journal, December 21st, 2017                                                                                                       Consolidation in the supertanker (VLCC) market at a time of weak freight rates and soft asset prices with a transformative acquisition where a storied company goes from a consolidator to being a target                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           – Is the Dry Bulk Tramp Trade at an Inflection Point? The Maritime Executive, December 1st, 2017                                                                                                        Article penned by Basil M Karatzas for The Maritime Executive on the challenges the dry bulk market is facing and a blind repeat of the past and “buying low, selling high” dry bulkers may be more complicated this time around.                                                                                                                                                                                                         – Dry bulk: Why the Year of the Dog can wag its tail, Lloyd’s List, November 23rd, 2017                                                                                                                                  2017 has turned out to be a decent year for the dry bulk market; although it’s hard to see how it could be worse than 2016 (worst year in living memory), shipowners seem to got their faith back that the industry is not completely dead                                                                                                                                                                                                   – A Specter Is Haunting Europe’s Recovery: Zombie Companies, The Wall Street Journal, November 22nd, 2017                                                                                        Many chronically loss-making companies in Europe are kept alive because of the kindness of the banks. Shipping companies are part of the landscape.                                                                                                                                                                                           – JPMorgan making big profits by flipping cargo vessels, The Globe and Mail, November 19th, 2017                                                                                                        In a weak freight market leading to soft asset prices (“cheap ships”) some financial players see opportunity of buying ships at low prices, and occasionally flipping them soon thereafter for an easy profit

Manhattan from afar. Cruiseship MS ‘Queen Mary 2″ can be seen moored at the Brooklyn Cruise Terminal (right of the picture) in between the Empire State Building and  the 432 Park sky-scraper. Image credit: Karatzas Images.

© 2013 – present Basil M Karatzas & Karatzas Marine Advisors & Co.  All Rights Reserved.

IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER:  Access to this blog signifies the reader’s irrevocable acceptance of this disclaimer. No part of this blog can be reproduced by any means and under any circumstances, whatsoever, in whole or in part, without proper attribution or the consent of the copyright and trademark holders of this website. Whilst every effort has been made to ensure that information here within has been received from sources believed to be reliable and such information is believed to be accurate at the time of publishing, no warranties or assurances whatsoever are made in reference to accuracy or completeness of said information, and no liability whatsoever will be accepted for taking or failing to take any action upon any information contained in any part of this website.  Thank you for the consideration.

Sailing the Seas Depends on the Helmsman

Once upon a time, there was an independent shipowner with, let’s say, ten modern product tankers. Three of their tankers were mortgaged with a major European bank, a very well-known name and with proven past commitment to the shipping industry. And, the shipowner themselves, have been in the shipping business for more than a couple of decades and enjoying a solid reputation in the shipping community and with charterers. These, being legacy shipping loans, their terms were highly competitive in this market despite some success of the bank to tighten the loan terms since the market collapse a few years ago. Actually, the terms of these loans were exceptional, by today’s standards, as the spread was just 300 basis points. And, of course, the shipowner had watched these loans like the apple of their eye, and they were current with interest payments and principal repayments and the loans were comfortably meeting the loan-to-value (LTV) covenants.

Eighteen months ago, the shipowner got a note from their mortgage bank that since they (the bank) were exiting the shipping industry, the shipowner was given notice to make arrangements to pay back the loans (there was a small discount offered) or the bank would had to take matters in their own hands. Since these were performing loans, the mortgage bank could sell the loans at close to par, likely to a credit fund or an institutional investor, or possibly even to another bank if there were still banks out there buying shipping loans – not a likely cozy prospect under any circumstances.

It took a few months for the shipowner to recover from the first shock, having a brand-name bank giving them notice on performing loans. And, it only got worse from there. The shipowner’s shock got greater as soon as they started “shopping” the market for new financing: few shipping banks had interest in new clients or business or the capacity to finance a three-vessel package. While approaching institutional investors, the strategy was modified to squeeze the mortgage bank for a hefty discount of the loans, but with the institutional investors sharing (a great deal of) the economics of the transaction and not just to provide new loans. Almost a year passed since the mortgage bank had given notice and the shipowner could not find a new “deal” good enough. But again, having to replace shipping loans priced at L+300 bps in today’s market, one feels like they have been punched in the stomach.

And, while the shipowner was taking their sweet time to find the perfect financing they thought they deserved, the product tanker freight market started deteriorating: first freight rates dipped and then halved, and, as one would expect, secondary market product tanker sales started taking place at lower price levels. While the shipowner had a few million in cash in the bank, dry-dockings and other expenses started chipping away on the balances. And, the lower asset prices triggered LTV defaults now, giving much more leeway to the bank to sell the vessels themselves, and not just the loans – an even worse prospect for the shipowner.

And, lower freight rates and lower asset prices were making financing the original loans more difficult: cash flows now would only support lower financing, and institutional investors lost appetite since any discount now had less value in a weakening market.

All being told, the shipowner managed to finance just two of the vessels at today’s prevailing conditions (lower leverage, tighter covenants and cost in excess of L+600 bps.) And, the third vessel was let go and was sold (at a small loss) since no financing could be found within the parameters of a weak freight market and limited “sweat equity” from the shipowner.

This is a real story (unfortunately) and no names or other details can be divulged; but, such details do not matter really. If there are lessons to be learned is that first, in this market, shipping finance is the “determining factor” of the shipping industry, the independent shipowners. Shipping finance is the new battlefield where shipowners will be called to fight; if they cannot sort out their shipping finance game in the new market, they will be driven out of business – as simple as that. Second, in this difficult market, it’s not only “bad shipowners” who have problems; if your bank is not committed to shipping or you or they are having higher priorities unrelated to shipping, that’s the weakest link in the business, even if the loans are good and performing. Third, it pays to be pro-active in this market and tie loose ends as soon as possible; looking for the perfect financing at the expense of time, one can lose much more than a few hundred basis points – not arguing that two hundred basis points are not worth fighting for, but again, this is not a time when banks and lenders can bend much, if at all. And, lastly, independent shipowners had become a substantial part of the industry based on their shipping and operational expertise and efficiencies and not on their financial expertise (shipping banks were lending in the past liberally and just on the basics of how to extend credit); the present market is much more sophisticated than that and hiring competent shipping advisors may very well be warranted; trying to avoid paying an advisory fee can cost one whole ships.

“Sailing the Seas Depends on the Helmsman” was a revolutionary, patriotic song for Mao Zedong’s Red Guards in the 1960’s and 1970’s exemplifying the Chairman’s leadership skills, metaphorically speaking. For an independent shipowner these days, sailing the seas depends on the helmsman navigating the new reality of the shipping finance markets.

A long shadow over one of world’s most important shipping cluster. Image credit: Karatzas Images

© 2013 – present Basil M Karatzas & Karatzas Marine Advisors & Co.  All Rights Reserved.

IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER:  Access to this blog signifies the reader’s irrevocable acceptance of this disclaimer. No part of this blog can be reproduced by any means and under any circumstances, whatsoever, in whole or in part, without proper attribution or the consent of the copyright and trademark holders of this website. Whilst every effort has been made to ensure that information here within has been received from sources believed to be reliable and such information is believed to be accurate at the time of publishing, no warranties or assurances whatsoever are made in reference to accuracy or completeness of said information, and no liability whatsoever will be accepted for taking or failing to take any action upon any information contained in any part of this website.  Thank you for the consideration.

Is the Dry Bulk Tramp Shipping Industry at an Inflection Point?

As punishingly brutal as the shipping industry can be in bad times, it’s fulfillingly rewarding in good times. Who can forget the days from a decade ago when capesize bulkers were earning $250,000 per diem and the ships themselves were changing hands in excess of $150 million? We are a long way from those good old days but memories of and even hopes for prompt arrival of great times keep many a shipowner persevering in this business. It’s known that sweet memories and often hopes have on occasion been used to spruce up many “investment theses” in investment presentations.

The dry bulk tramp trade – whereby ships do not sail on a fixed schedule or published ports of call – has long been considered a textbook case of perfect competition in economics with its low barriers to entry and exit, minimal government and regulatory interference and taxation, an international market of price-takers for an un-differentiated product where no individual player – whether shipowner or charterer – has controlling influence on the market.

In such an individualistic market environment, fortunes have been made – and occasionally lost – when independent shipowners took timely risks and positioned their companies favorably on the dramatic upswing of the business cycle. Now that the dry bulk market is closer to the bottom than the peak of the cycle, there are calls to take risks for a market upswing.

Probably the timing is opportune for buying bulkers in expectations of an upswing in the market but one has to consider whether the dry bulk tramp market still is a market adhering to the rules of a perfectly competitive market. The last decade has seen many fundamental changes in the market that one has to wonder whether the old playbook is still working.

The greatest barrier to entry the shipping industry has been capital, given that this is a capital intensive industry. However, in past times shipping banks were providing generous financing in terms of financial gearing (leverage) and covenants, and even there have been cases of “name lending” and financing agreed on a handshake. Now that shipping banks have been departing the industry, and with the capital markets veering away from project finance and commodity shipping, private equity and other institutional investors have been depended upon to provide capital to shipping but at a much higher cost of capital, tighter terms and covenants and often for a share of the economics. The barriers to entry in terms of accessing capital have definitely been affecting the industry in an adverse way, in this respect.

In reference to government interference and regulation, for vessels having open registries (flags of convenience), the burden is still low in comparison to other onshore industries, but one can see the writing on the wall of higher regulation (and higher costs.) Emissions and the quality of bunker fuel have been making headline news in the last year resulting in both a higher financial component to the business and also technological and regulatory risk. Likewise for ballast water treatment plans, past the official deadlines, technology and approvals only now are getting sorted out. Likely, there will be higher risks for safety and security and ensuring that ships and the seaways supply chain are supported by hack-free systems (ransomware NotPetya have cost Maersk a few hundred million in losses in their last quarterly report, while the possibility of “hacked” ships became a prominent scenario in a recent wave of collisions involving US Navy ships in the Pacific.) And, while offshore registered vessels are taxed on the so-called “tonnage tax” system, many revenue-challenged jurisdictions and taxpayers have been taking a second look on the substantial differential in taxation in reference to domestically registered shipping companies and the potential loss of revenue. Taxation is a risk routinely mentioned in the prospectuses of all publicly listed companies in the US-capital markets and that the current favorable treatment by the IRS cannot always considered to be “a sure thing”. Thus, in an increasingly burdensome era of regulations (environment, safety, security, etc) and taxation, another of the legs of perfect competition seems challenged.

In theory, the “product” that dry bulk shipping companies “sell” is a “commodity” and “interchangeable” as all dry bulk shipping companies offer the service of transporting cargoes in bulk over the sea; as simple as that. And, although there are many charterers who only care for the basic good of cheap transport, an ever increasing number of quality charterers demand more than the “basic” service of transport: they demand quality ships and proper management systems and real time reporting and accountability, and also solid shipowners and managers free of financial risk of default. Thus, the “product” of the tramp dry bulk shipping slowly becomes less commoditized and more of a “service” whereby now ships and shipowners are not exactly interchangeable. Quality ships run by quality managers are preferred by charterers, but they still earn market price; and, in order to be profitable at market prices, critical mass of a fleet is required in order to access capital and also spread the overhead among a larger number of vessels. Thus, another tenet of the perfect competition model that dry bulk is a “commodity” good is slowly challenged.

At the end of the day, dry bulk shipowners in the tramp trade are “price takers” and will take what the market pays as there is little pricing power; again, a perfect competition characteristic. However, the case of just buying cheap ships and wait for the market to recovery will not necessarily hold true in this new market environment. One has to wonder whether the tramp dry bulk market, as a precursor to other asset classes – is slowly approaching an inflection point where “value added” services would be a differentiating factor.

“Hope is a good thing, maybe the best of things, and no good thing ever dies”, as the quote goes, but one may has to start thinking that just hope alone of a market recovery similar to recoveries in previous business cycles may not be the case.


Article was originally was published on The Maritime Executive under the title “Is The Dry Bulk Tramp Market at an Inflection Point?” on December 1st, 2017.


Dry bulk vessel about to go under a bridge. Image credit: Karatzas Images

© 2013 – present Basil M Karatzas & Karatzas Marine Advisors & Co.  All Rights Reserved.

IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER:  Access to this blog signifies the reader’s irrevocable acceptance of this disclaimer. No part of this blog can be reproduced by any means and under any circumstances, whatsoever, in whole or in part, without proper attribution or the consent of the copyright and trademark holders of this website. Whilst every effort has been made to ensure that information here within has been received from sources believed to be reliable and such information is believed to be accurate at the time of publishing, no warranties or assurances whatsoever are made in reference to accuracy or completeness of said information, and no liability whatsoever will be accepted for taking or failing to take any action upon any information contained in any part of this website.  Thank you for the consideration.