Sailing Winds on Wall Street

Shipping is an industry full of surprises. And, volatility. While until February this year the surprise mainly had been about the really terrible state of the freight market, the last few months have shown a tendency for the market to surprise on the positive side. Freight rates for the dry bulk market have moved to cash-flow positive levels in the last few months and tanker freight rates have been fair despite some relative weakness.

It’s a long way from saying that the market has recovered, no doubt. Many shipowners still remain in financial distress and several of the options available to shipping banks can only have adversarial impact on shipowners. But again, when shipping has been in a miserable stage for the last eight years, there are no overnight cures – short of a major macro or geopolitical event.

Besides freight rates, the overall mood for the market seems to be improving; we do not mean only shipowners, who by nature are always an optimistic bunch and they seem pre-conditioned to be looking to buy more ships – always. The capital market seem to have gotten a sense of euphoria too after the presidential elections in the US, whether on a sense of a perceived catalyst of definitely a new approach to governing or on the hopes of an infrastructure investment spree. The fact that capital markets didn’t melt after the results of the Italian elections last week is a further sign of pervasive optimism.

And, we are glad to see that market optimism getting tangible for shipping companies, especially for publicly listed companies. After several years of a bone-dry draught for IPOs and secondary offerings, the last month, just in time for the holidays, brought several successful fund raisings. Most recently, Seanergy of Greece (ticker: SHIP) raised $15 mil in a secondary offering and Safe Bulkers still of Greece (ticker: SB) raised $14 million the week prior; both companies are active in the dry bulk market and intend to finance vessel acquisitions with the proceeds. A couple of weeks ago, Costamare of Greece (ticker: CMRE) raised $72 mil in the containership markets and Höegh LNG of Norway (ticker HMLP) raised $106 mil in the LNG tanker market. A month ago, Saverys in Belgium raised $100 mil in the US for a blank check (SPAC) to acquire dry bulk vessels via their Hunter Maritime Acquisition Corp (ticker: HUNTU) investment vehicle.

The amounts involved are a small fraction of the golden days of the capital markets for shipping companies a decade ago; however, until recently it has been a very quiet market in the capital markets for IPOs and secondary offerings for all types of companies. However, this is a positive development under any light seen. All the offerings mentioned above took some serious effort and / or a serious management team and sponsor behind the companies to raise the money; and still, some of the raisings took place at a discount to the market. Thus, not all news is as rosy and sunny as they appear. However, again, we want to take the view that a successful raising today for shipping is a major accomplishment irrespective of the circumstances. These are five successful attempts for different amounts of money and circumstances and in three different industry segments, two of which (dry bulk and containerships) were left for dead four months ago. It shows in our opinion the resilience of the capital markets and the investor appetite for shipping overall. To that extent, we tend to take the view that the news is just fantastic!

Hopefully the momentum will continue and there will be more offerings in the new year. And, hopefully, any fund raisings will be utilized to build solid shipping companies or strengthen balance sheets of shipping companies and the capital markets will not serve as a fodder for speculative newbuilding orders as it happened a couple of years ago, a course of action that has been detrimental for both the instigators and innocent bystanders whereby the freight market crashed under the burden of huge tonnage oversupply. Hopefully there is a lesson to be learned here.

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Smooth seas… Image credit: Karatzas Images.

Another lesson to be learned too, hopefully, by the recent developments is that the capital markets, especially the US capital markets, are deep and substantial and can be depended upon for shipowners to keep raising money; as long as they have solid management teams and transparent corporate governance and decent business plans. All the companies mentioned above successfully check almost all of these points. Taking a broader historical view of the capital markets and shipping, there has been a wide and diverse populace of shipping companies that opportunistically went public in the last decade and now a few of them ended as penny-stocks or and others soon will be delisted. One cannot blame the market for some of these companies falling into hard times, but there is plenty of blame to go around seeing the management of these companies aggrandizing for themselves by exorbitant executive compensation packages, usurious vessel management agreements and plain old-fashioned self-dealing. Hopefully the present success of shipping companies raising money will be a painful reminder to some of the ailing companies that greed is not always good as it can kill the goose that lays the golden eggs.

We long have taken the position – and have advised our firm’s clients accordingly, that shipping finance is facing structural changes; the old model of committing to lending in shipping based on a hand-shake is extinct. Raising money from shipping banks is and will be getting tougher and more expensive. Capital will be coming to shipping in different ways (capital markets, etc) whereby only few owners will be able to benefit from. The work for shipowners adjusting to the new market circumstances is not done yet.

As we said earlier, we are a long way from a market recovery.


Disclaimer: Karatzas Marine Advisors & Co. has advised or otherwise has been involved with some of the market transactions referenced above. This article is strictly intended for information purposes.


The article was originally appeared on the Maritime Executive under the title “Setting Sail (Again) on Wall Street on December 13, 2016.


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Where the winds are strong… Image credit: Karatzas Images

IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER:  Access to this blog signifies the reader’s irrevocable acceptance of this disclaimer. No part of this blog can be reproduced by any means and under any circumstances, whatsoever, in whole or in part, without proper attribution or the consent of the copyright and trademark holders of this website. Whilst every effort has been made to ensure that information here within has been received from sources believed to be reliable and such information is believed to be accurate at the time of publishing, no warranties or assurances whatsoever are made in reference to accuracy or completeness of said information, and no liability whatsoever will be accepted for taking or failing to take any action upon any information contained in any part of this website.  Thank you for the consideration.

Basil M Karatzas and Karatzas Marine Advisors Quoted in the News

The shipping industry has been maintaining a very active profile in the mainstream international business press. Major bankruptcies, reorganizations, merges, vessel arrests and auctions are daily routine these days. Shipping banks, shipping loans actively and non performing loans (NPL) along with provisions are of concern or interest to many.  And, the  freight market that keeps surprising in terms of volatility.

We are delighted that Karatzas Marine Advisors & Co., and its founder Basil M Karatzas have become the contact to have for shipping market expertise; with prompt access to market information and a vast network and access to senior executives worldwide, in the shipping industry and several complimentary industries, the company has had a front row seat to today’s developments in the maritime industry and has been enjoying an active deal-flow and the trust of many in the shipping industry.

Dry-Bulk Shipping Owners Get Reprieve as Rates Rebound
(Wall Street Journal, November 24, 2016)

What Will Save the Shipping Industry? Eight Industry Thoughts Leaders Weigh In   (LLoyd’s List, November 17, 2016)

Taiwan Approves $1.9 Billion Aid Package to Troubled Shipping Companies
(Wall Street Journal, November 16, 2016)

Varsler shippinghavari (translated as ‘Warning Signs for Shipping’)
Dagens Næringsliv, (November 11, 2016 – In Norwegian)

Τα απόνερα από την εκλογή Τραμπ
(Η Ναυτεμπορικἠ, November 10, 2016 – In Greek)

Israel’s Zim Looking to Sell Most Global Shipping Operations
(Wall Street Journal, November 4, 2016)

Japan’s Largest Shipping Firms to Merge Container Operations
(Wall Street Journal, October 31, 2016)

Offen Group Selling Two MR Tankers
(Lloyd’s List, October 25, 2016)

Pressure on German shipping lenders unlikely to ease
(The Financial Times, September 21, 2016)

Guest Voices: Shipping Banks Face Sinking Prospects as They Postpone Reckoning
(Wall Street Journal, September 19, 2016)

It’s not over – Shipping industry adapting to difficult times
(Wärtsilä, September 12, 2016)

Shipping industry not buoyed by low fuel costs
(The Cayman Islands Journal, June 1, 2016)

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Aptly named containership vessel MV ‘King Basil’ departing the port of Piraeus. Image credit: Karatzas Images

© 2013 – present Basil M Karatzas & Karatzas Marine Advisors & Co.  All Rights Reserved.

IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER:  Access to this blog signifies the reader’s irrevocable acceptance of this disclaimer. No part of this blog can be reproduced by any means and under any circumstances, whatsoever, in whole or in part, without proper attribution or the consent of the copyright and trademark holders of this website. Whilst every effort has been made to ensure that information here within has been received from sources believed to be reliable and such information is believed to be accurate at the time of publishing, no warranties or assurances whatsoever are made in reference to accuracy or completeness of said information, and no liability whatsoever will be accepted for taking or failing to take any action upon any information contained in any part of this website.  Thank you for the consideration.

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Hanjin’s History Lessons

‘Time is the longest distance between two places’ concludes the Tennessee Williams’ character at the end of the play The Glass Menagerie. For a large number of creditors, vendors, tonnage providers, and predominantly shippers – with $14 billion worth of merchandise packed in containers onboard Hanjin ships, this philological expression was a very hard lesson to put to practice when the company filed for receivership at the end of August.  At present, and with everything going well, the best estimate is that Hanjin’s vessels will be unloaded by the end of October. A very long time indeed for shipping containers ‘lost’ between ports at today’s age.

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In better days… Image credit: Karatzas Images

The developments with Hanjin are still work-in-progress that may take several months, if not years, to settle permanently. For now, it’s a logistical nightmare bordering a legal saga that, in turn, stands on the periphery of the self-feeding financial crisis. Each one of these three parallel worlds will have to run their own course and trajectory, but again, not too far apart from each other. Definitely many lessons beg be learned once all is said and done, and the containers get delivered and the bills get paid, eventually. The fact that Hanjin Shipping has been the largest containership liner company bankruptcy ever (the second biggest was that of the United States Lines in 1986, when the boxship world was still in its infancy) will provide plenty of lessons on where the ‘stress points’ are in the system and the supply chain, and would provide some insight on whether the containership liner industry is a ‘systemic’ industry to the world’s trade.  There have been numerous financial restructurings and bankruptcies in shipping since the crisis ensued in 2008, but almost all of them were in the dry bulk and tanker sectors, where the logistical head-scratchers were much easier to address: usually there is one charterer or cargo owner per vessel per voyage in the dry bulk and tanker markets and not the plethora of cargoes and shippers and vendors with their boxes onboard a containership.

While it will take time to know the fine detail of the numerous parts interacting together in the liner business, a perfunctory view of the case, based on info available so far, indicates that all the factors one would expect to see in the cause of a default in the shipping industry were present in the Hanjin case.

The company, going after market and trying to keep up with the main players in the market, had effectively became a house of cards in terms of over-leverage, financially and operationally. Almost one hundred vessels (out of the 140 vessels under management) were chartered in, effectively with off-balance sheet, non-recourse financing. When the banks and lenders stop lending when one’s balance sheet gets stretched, an ambitious shipowner can just turn to the charter market and can pile up abundantly on tonnage based on their ‘signature’ and their (unsecured) promise to pay. No more than that is needed. Just a ‘sterling’ name and a ‘first class client’, as the saying goes, can be of enough assurance for charter payments and place a tall house a cards in short order. This was once a big deal even back then in 2008, for those who recall.

And, there were plenty of companies and shipowners who had been just happy to offer their tonnage on long term charters to Hanjin, just to show to their own shareholders and lenders that they had cash flow visibility and they were not speculators. Nice long charters with juicy cash-flows that paid until they stopped, that is. It may be worth asking whether such business practice was the result of poor risk management or just a case when no-one really questions whether the emperor may be naked. ‘If so many other tonnage providers had found Hanjin to be a quality charterer, who am I to stop chartering to them vessels’, one almost may be able to hear in a boardroom discussion.

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When days were great… Image credit: Karatzas Images

And, Hanjin was not just any charterer. They had real substance since they were a liner company and had access to the end user. If things turned bad for the market, as they did indeed, Hanjin would have cargoes to move and keep the ships busy and therefore keep making the lease and charter-hire payments. They had access to their own terminals (at least partially), and they had preferential access to S. Korea’s promising and export-oriented economy, and thus, they were supposed to have a backstop if things were to get ugly. As we learn now, a bad market is a bad market and it burns cash for stand-alone owners but also burns cash for strategic owners, like Hanjin, too. Notions of an end-user charterer are great, but again, a bad market can pinch sharply enough to make the pain felt on the bone of an end-user.

And, Hanjin was part of a substantial industrial conglomerate with strategic access to the ‘system’, that is the government and the state banks; it had to, as being a chaebol company, they had the implicit ‘put option’ of the government itself. And beautifully this was played until when the cash burn topped US$ 2 million per diem, and all the constituents had to look for alternative solutions. You can support a company-in-need for so long, but again, all love in this world has to have some limits.  And with Hyundai Merchant Marine (HMM), the local competitor, reaching the restructuring altar in the summer first, there were one too many brides afterwards. There are still many more containership and liner companies that could be considered to have a quasi-government guarantee worldwide. Caveat emptor.

As much as we would like to believe that the Hanjin case will be an example to be held, one has to be doubtful. Time and again, defaults happen in shipping with almost metronomic frequency, and all the times, the same old factors drive those shipping companies to the ground, or the bottom of the sea for that matter: aggressiveness, over-leverage, poor risk management, over-reliance on fundamental assumptions that turn out to be fundamentally wrong, and wishful thinking.

But again, if it were not for all these surprises, shipping would be just any other boring industry. One-dimensional with ships floating beautifully over the ocean. Apparently, there is the dimension of time, at least until one gets their container delivered.


The article above was first published on Splash 247 under the heading ‘Hanjin’s Longest Voyage Yet’ on October 17, 2016.


© 2013 – present Basil M Karatzas & Karatzas Marine Advisors & Co.  All Rights Reserved.

IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER:  Access to this blog signifies the reader’s irrevocable acceptance of this disclaimer. No part of this blog can be reproduced by any means and under any circumstances, whatsoever, in whole or in part, without proper attribution or the consent of the copyright and trademark holders of this website. Whilst every effort has been made to ensure that information here within has been received from sources believed to be reliable and such information is believed to be accurate at the time of publishing, no warranties or assurances whatsoever are made in reference to accuracy or completeness of said information, and no liability whatsoever will be accepted for taking or failing to take any action upon any information contained in any part of this website.  Thank you for the consideration.

Moral Hazard and Hanjin Shipping

Not a week has passed since we posted an article on the Maritime Executive’s website about moral hazard in shipping, and the shipping world got a big-proportions, real-life case study of the risks in the industry. We argued that when shipowners are over their heads in debt and with little promise of ever recovering any equity, there is precious little they care about financing, operations, trade, safety and even the environment.

Hanjin Shipping, based in South Korea and world’s seventh biggest containership company, filed for protection in S. Korean courts in late August, and subsequently started filing for protection in several jurisdictions worldwide, including in the United States federal bankruptcy court (filing for Chapter 15 restructuring in Newark, NJ). As of the end of second quarter this year in June, the company had outstanding obligations close to US$ 5.5 billion, approximately US$ 900 million of which due by the end of 2017. There were approximately US$ 700 million in equity on the balance sheet. Hanjin stands as the manager of appr. 142 vessels, 98 of which are containerships and 44 are tankers and bulkers. Only one-fourth of Hanjin’s fleet is self-owned, 38 of them owned and the rest chartered in from leasing companies and other financially-minded shipowners. The ownership mix of the tonnage indicates more of a light-asset, trading company rather an asset-heavy, ship-owning balance sheet. The current value of the owned fleet stands at appr. US$ 1.7 billion.

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Shipping crossing a bridge… Image Credit: Karatzas Images

Many details are still too opaque and covered by bilateral non-disclosure agreements, but where several of the counterparties have been publicly listed companies, one can draw certain conclusions: Hanjin had chartered in two 2010-built capsize vessels from publicly listed Navios Maritime Partners (ticker: NNA) MV ‘Navios Luz’ and MV ‘Navios Buena Ventura’ at a daily rate of US$ 29,356 pd each; the average spot capesize market was barely $6,000 pd during the last year, and presuming that Hanjin was trading the vessels on the spot market, they were losing $23,000 every single day for the last year ; of each of the two vessels. That is $16 mil down the drain for the two vessels in just the last year alone; each of the vessels had more than four years of employment remaining with the shipowner, and presuming that the spot capesize market would remain at present levels, Hanjin would had to suffer another $90 mil in losses for just these two vessels. Eight containerships chartered in from Danaos (ticker: DAC) had charter payment obligations of appr. $565 million. Similarly, three neo-panamax containerships from Seaspan (ticker: SSW) had outstanding charter obligations of close to US$ 370 million. These charter obligations add up to close to US$ 900 million, and under present market conditions, reasonable estimates would be for losses of more than US$ 500 million. And these are the calculations based on publicly available information for only thirteen of the 100+ vessels chartered-in, with only three counterparties. There are un-accounted obligations for more than eighty vessels that have been chartered in from other owners.

$23,000 losses every single day in the last year for each of the two capes chartered from Navios. Talk about destruction of value!

What options such a ‘shipowner’ like Hanjin (effectively a structured house of cards) does have under the circumstances? As one would suspect, very few. There is little in matter of equity, there is little in matter of collateral, there is lots of debt, and mostly, most of the debt is in relatively unsecured position since it’s in the form of charter obligations for the vessels that have been contracted on charter arrangements.

Playing the devil’ advocate and ask surreal but economically oriented questions: How much vested interest the shipowner has in the assets and the business? Precious little, at this stage. What are the odds that they will recover any equity? Probably better than hitting the jackpot in a national lottery, which we all know is not a fair proposition. What would any rational economic being would do? Briefly, either ask for the mercy of their creditors, or, having little to lose, just stop paying the creditors and pass the buck to the other side. What we called moral hazard in the previous posting.

Hanjin had been rumored (along with their co-patriot Hyundai Merchant Marine (HMM)) to be facing financial problems and was an accident waiting to happen. HMM, being slicker, and faster, and part of a big chaebol (traditional corporate conglomerate structure in S. Korea, strongly affiliated with family management style and running businesses deemed strategically important to the State, in exchange of the State’s preferential treatment), managed in August to find their way out of their financial ‘pickle’. When Hanjin tried to secure the consent and more financing from their lenders (mostly Korean banks and the state-owned Korean Development Bank), there was little empathy. This would make perfect sense, as their lenders were in relatively preferred senior position, and any new financing would be considered either ‘throwing good money after bad money’ or diluting their position and getting lower on the seniority scale of claimants. It would make economic sense to refuse any new financing and let the un-secured creditors (that is the shipowners of the hundred vessels on charter to Hanjin, like Navios, Diana, Seaspan) accept a less demanding solution. Again, Hanjin and their prime financiers decided to drop the moral hazard bomb to the parties with a lower legal claim, the shipowners of the vessels.

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The good times left behind… Image Credit: Karatzas Images

Hanjin Shipping is the seventh containership company in the world but with only appr. 3% market, thus, belonging in the lower tier of containership companies as compared to behemoths like Moeller Maersk, Cosco, MSC and CMA CGM. A default by Hanjin cannot be expected to have a major domino effect on the overall shipping or containership world markets. The majority of Hanjin’s lenders were Korean banks, including the Korean Development Bank (KDB), and the Korean banking system (and the Korean taxpayer, if so required) can absorb the losses without posing a systemic risk to the Korean economy, at least at this stage. Hanjin had been a major carrier for LG electronics, but again, even Hanjin’s demise could not be detrimental to LG and the Korean electronics and manufacturing industries; not to mention, since HMM’s successful restructuring in the summer, now there has been an alternative, an alternative based in Korea itself (subsequent reports state the LG has already been shifting their shipment contracts to HMM). Thus, once the situation was ‘ring fenced’ and a fall-out was determined to be contained, Hanjin and its main creditors stopped paying to the lower standing creditors (other shipowners with charter-in tonnage). An example of moral hazard in all its glory.

Hanjin has filed for restructuring (and not for liquidation) expecting to find a way to save the company as a going concern over the long term. However, owners of vessels on charter to Hanjin, companies like Danaos, Seaspan, Navios and many other smaller, private owners, stand to lose the most. In an oversupplied market of low freight rates, it will be difficult to withdraw their vessels from Hanjin and seek equally profitable charter rates elsewhere in the present market; likely, they will have to accept lower and extended rates that Hanjin will offer them, and possibly some equity upside if and when the company recovers. Otherwise, the shipowners will have to seek legal remedies which are costly and time consuming, and always risky on whether there will be a chance to ever collect. After all, the events of last week have shown that Hanjin is not a systemically important company to the Korean economy, there is little the Korean constituents that can lose, there is little left for Hanjin’s management and shareholders to lose. Heads I win, tail you lose.

A case of moral hazard of the highest caliber.


A better edited version of this article was originally published on The Maritime Executive website on September 6th, 2016 under the title ‘Moral Hazard Case Study: Hanjin Shipping’.  This article builds on our essay on the dangers of the moral hazard in a weak freight market posted in early September in this post, when market participants were left with few options and little to lose, so much so that they care little for the outcome or the interests other constituents of the shipping industry.


© 2013 – present Basil M Karatzas & Karatzas Marine Advisors & Co.  All Rights Reserved.

IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER:  Access to this blog signifies the reader’s irrevocable acceptance of this disclaimer. No part of this blog can be reproduced by any means and under any circumstances, whatsoever, in whole or in part, without proper attribution or the consent of the copyright and trademark holders of this website. Whilst every effort has been made to ensure that information here within has been received from sources believed to be reliable and such information is believed to be accurate at the time of publishing, no warranties or assurances whatsoever are made in reference to accuracy or completeness of said information, and no liability whatsoever will be accepted for taking or failing to take any action upon any information contained in any part of this website.  Thank you for the consideration.

Lexis Nexis – Hanjin Receivership Free Webinar

Hanjin Shipping‘s filings in early September 2016, for receivership in South Korean court and subsequent filing for Chapter 15 protection in US federal bankruptcy court, have been making front-pages news even in general interest newspapers and media. The case revolves around logistical, legal and financial considerations interweaved perilously together and can potentially affect everyday life with peak shopping season soon upon us.

LexisNexis Legal & Professional is hosting a Free Webinar on the matter of Hanjin’s receivership addressing both legal and commercial issues of the case. The Webinar is held on Wednesday October 5th, 2016 at 15:00 hrs EDT.

Registration is fee and open to the general public. Entities interested in the case and its repercussions, whether they have immediate outstanding claims in the case or looking for general information on the case and the overall shipping markets are encouraged to register to attend.

We are delighted that Basil M Karatzas, CEO of Karatzas Marine Advisors & Co., has been invited to participate at the Webinar and address questions of commercial nature on the case and the overall shipping markets.

Mr Daniel Saval, partner with Brown Rudnick LLP, and holding substantial experience with Chapter 15 law, will be addressing legal questions during the session.

The Webinar will expertly be moderated by Ms. Danielle Bennett, Esq., Subject Matter Advisor on Banking, Finance and Restructuring with Lexis Nexis.

LexisNexis Legal & Professional is a leading global provider of content and technology solutions that enable professionals in legal, corporate, tax, government, academic and non-profit organizations to make informed decisions and achieve better business outcomes. As a digital pioneer, the company was the first to bring legal and business information online with its Lexis® and Nexis® services. Today, LexisNexis Legal & Professional harnesses leading-edge technology and world-class content to help professionals work in faster, easier and more effective ways. Through close collaboration with its customers, the company ensures organizations can leverage its solutions to reduce risk, improve productivity, increase profitability and grow their business. LexisNexis Legal & Professional, which serves customers in more than 175 countries with 10,000 employees worldwide, is part of RELX Group, a world-leading provider of information and analytics for professional and business customers across industries.

To Register for the Free Webinar, please click on the brochure herebelow and follow the instructions! We are looking forward to receiving the benefit of your participation at the event, on Wed October 5th, 2016, at 15:00 hrs EDT!

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© 2013 – present Basil M Karatzas & Karatzas Marine Advisors & Co.  All Rights Reserved.

IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER:  Access to this blog signifies the reader’s irrevocable acceptance of this disclaimer. No part of this blog can be reproduced by any means and under any circumstances, whatsoever, in whole or in part, without proper attribution or the consent of the copyright and trademark holders of this website. Whilst every effort has been made to ensure that information here within has been received from sources believed to be reliable and such information is believed to be accurate at the time of publishing, no warranties or assurances whatsoever are made in reference to accuracy or completeness of said information, and no liability whatsoever will be accepted for taking or failing to take any action upon any information contained in any part of this website.  Thank you for the consideration.

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Hanjin Shipping in Receivership

On August 31st, 2016, Hanjin Shipping filed a receivership petition with Seoul’s Central District Court, and on September 6th, for Chapter 15 protection at US Federal Bankruptcy Court in Newark, NJ. Filings in approximately 45 jurisdictions worldwide, where Hanjin vessels trade, are expected to be filed in the very near term.

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Containership MV ‘Hanjin Monaco’ against the downtown Manhattan skyline in better days. Image credit: Karatzas Images.

With approximately 140 vessels under management, only 40 of which are self-owned and 100 chartered-in or leased, there have been serious implications for the market, at least in the short term. With only US$ 700 mil in equity, US$ 1.7 billion value of its fleet and $5.4 billion in outstanding obligations, the capital structure resembles a house of cards. The value of the cargo on-board of Hanjin’s vessels at the time of filing for receivership was estimated at $14.5 billion. The ensuing result has been a logistical nightmare, given all such cargo had contractual obligations to be delivered on time, but Hanjin’s vendors would not render any services unless they were getting paid in advance. Receivership and Chapter 15 can stop creditors from knocking on the door, but vendors would now perform only on cash basis payments. Hanjin’s financial nightmare has been compounded by the legal complexity of the business which is further compounded by the logistical complexity of the containership liner business. Only the fact that the containership market has appr. 25% capacity (which has caused Hanjin’s financial troubles in the first place) can alleviate concerns that Hanjin’s potential demise will no be a threat to the supply chain and international trade.

Hanjin’s filing has been front page news for the whole last week. Here’s a list of articles in the print, TV and radio coverage where Basil M Karatzas and Karatzas Marine Advisors & Co were quoted:

Moral Hazard Case Study: Hanjin Shipping                                                          Maritime Executive, September 6th 2016

Containers Stranded at Sea After South Korean Company Goes Bankrupt         NPR, All Things Considered, September 8th, 2016                                                    To Listen to the Audio Clip, Please Click here!  

Retailers Seek U.S Help With Shipping Crisis                                                            The Wall Street Journal, September 1st, 2016

Hanjin Shipping Bankruptcy Unlikely to Ease Gluts of Vessels                                    The Wall Street Journal, September 2nd, 2016

Shipping Chaos                                                                                                              The Exchange CBC News Canadian Broadcasting Corporation                                TV Interview, September 2nd, 2016

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Basil Karatzas on CBC News – The Exchange about Hanjin Shipping’s Receivership. Image credit: CBC

© 2013 – present Basil M Karatzas & Karatzas Marine Advisors & Co.  All Rights Reserved.

IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER:  Access to this blog signifies the reader’s irrevocable acceptance of this disclaimer. No part of this blog can be reproduced by any means and under any circumstances, whatsoever, in whole or in part, without proper attribution or the consent of the copyright and trademark holders of this website. Whilst every effort has been made to ensure that information here within has been received from sources believed to be reliable and such information is believed to be accurate at the time of publishing, no warranties or assurances whatsoever are made in reference to accuracy or completeness of said information, and no liability whatsoever will be accepted for taking or failing to take any action upon any information contained in any part of this website.  Thank you for the consideration.

 

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The chronically weak freight market and moral hazard

Low freight rates have been a concern for a great number of reasons and to a wide range of market participants: low freight rates entail weak cash flows for the shipowners who cannot perform on their loans and causing problems for the shipping lenders; investors in shipping having experienced poor returns on their investments contemplating asset sales and leading even lower asset prices; shipbuilders facing a great deal of slippage and defaults on existing newbuilding orders while demand for additional orders has vaporized; charterers and cargo owners have to be very careful that vessels chartered even in the spot market not only are seaworthy and commercially competitive, but also the shipowner is current with their financial obligations and there is no risk of seeing the vessel delayed or arrested and the cargo onboard not delivered on time; likewise, vendors to the shipping industry have to be experts with managing credit risk and keep their clients on a short leash (further curtailing market activity and their own business).

All the concerns mentioned above emanate from a single cause, a low freight market that radiates and affects every dimension of the shipping market. Despite the recent bounce in the dry bulk market, freight rates are still very low and at barely operating break-even levels. The freight markets have been too low and for too long, and shipowners, still in business, have had to dip deeply into their cash reserves or seen their equity overly diluted. There is little more aside in terms of cash reserves, funding from investors and financiers outside the industry, or for that matter, of patience.

Based on recent transactions and experience, now another concern has to be added to the long list springing from a weak freight market: moral hazard. Moral hazard in this case can be defined as the behavior where an owner is so much disengaged from reality as to act carelessly in reference to the asset and the parties with an interest in the asset. The most obvious example is when the owner’ economic interest in the asset is so minuscule that there is precious little to care about the asset.

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Neo-panamax containership MV ‘Hanjin Namu’ entering the Port of Piraeus in better days. Image credit: Karatzas Images

There has been moral hazard in reference to financing and outstanding shipping loans. When the principal amount of the ship mortgage is materially higher than the present value of the vessel (and any hope of market recovery thereof), the shipowner has little incentive to make any effort to fulfill their obligations according to the loan agreement. There is very little hope that they will ever see their money back and thus little incentive to behave. Several owners we know had been making good, more or less, on their loans for the last couple of years in the hope of a market recovery. Two years later, having thrown good money after bad money, and reaching the bottom of their cash reserve piles, now they are barely inclined to keep performing. There have been cases of shipowners who have stopped paying interest and principal of their loans despite having the financial capacity to do so. They are better off with shipping loans in default than with performing loans. First, they reserve capital, which they can deploy to new clean-slate shipping investments and let the legacy transactions sink. Second, for loans in default, shipping banks seem keener to grand concessions to shipowners with non-performing loans while they seem to uphold ‘good’ shipowners at a much higher standard. Thus, it pays to be bad. Thirdly, there had been traditionally an unspoken law in shipping that for a borrower defaulting to a shipping bank, effectively they were ostracized for life by the ship banking community, thus a very high incentive to behave: not to borrow more than one could afford, and, even when things turned sour, to make every effort to see the lender to recover as much as possible of the principal outstanding. Now with several executives at shipping banks being corporate officers with little knowledge of or affection for shipping or with a great deal of shipping banks actively exiting shipping, there is no longer the self-watching ship banking community to ensure proper borrower behavior and thus, plenty of room for moral hazard. Sort of, ‘what they can do to me?’

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Image credit: Karatzas Images

There has been moral hazard in reference to the maintenance of the vessels as well. When the freight market is low, economizing by cutting on expenses is required to make do with less and ensure survival in a challenging market. First goes the ‘fat’ and then ‘discretionary spending’ (spare parts onboard the vessel is the classic case) and then laying off people ashore, and then keeping vessel maintenance only to the extent that the classification society requires in order to renew the certificates. Talking to inspectors boarding vessels on behalf of charterers, the technical quality of the vessels has become a concern; and, this concern is highly troubling for tankers and for oil companies given the level of liability in the event of an accident involving pollution. Talking to inspectors boarding vessels on behalf of the port state control (such as the US Coast Guard), there is real concern about vessels that have been under-maintained. Talking to inspectors boarding vessels on behalf of buyers of ships in the secondary market, there is lots of concern about vessels that have been neglected for too long. With the freight market too weak for too long and with many vessels afloat ‘depending on the kindness of strangers’, there is little incentive to do anything above the absolutely minimum required in terms of maintenance.

There has been moral hazard in reference to seafarers and the environment as well. There have been several stories recently in the trade press about seafarers getting abandoned, gone unpaid for months and malnourished, and even stories of vessels arrested due to outstanding crew wages. And, in a market place where the shipowner does not care much about the asset or the lender or the crew, it’s hard to envision how or why they would care much about anything else, such as the environment or adhering to sound navigational practices. Such is the risk of moral hazard.

There is no doubt that we are living through unique times in shipping; the present shipping crisis has been much more monstrous than others in the past. Examples of moral hazard is a known consequence of rapidly shifting economic structures and defaults (think of moral hazard in the subprime real estate in the US a few years ago). However, given that there is low expectation of a market recovery in the near future, issues arising from moral hazard will only get more complicated and perilous. After all, moral hazard in shipping can affect trade, human lives and the environment. When contemplating actions in shipping at present, one has to be cognizant of addressing alignment of interests and dissipation of moral hazard.

There is an anecdote of Shipowner A confiding to their friend, Shipowner B, that Shipping Bank X arrested four of their vessels. ‘Oh dear,’ replies Shipowner B, ‘I am so sorry to hear. And now, who is your best banking relationship?’ he asks, to which, Shipowner A dryly replies with relief: ‘I think I already told you, Bank X’!

As funny as the joke is, a market cannot function on such a basis.


The above article was originally published on The Maritime Executive website on August 30th, 2016, under the title: “Shipping’s Moral Hazard”. We are thankful to the Editors of The Maritime Executive for hosting our article.


bmti-1An abbreviated version of the article suitable for the weekly market report was published on September 2, 2016 by BMTI in Germany, under the title: “Concerns About Moral Hazard in the Shipping Industry”. We are thankful to our friends at BMTI (a well respected dry bulk market data provider, with special focus on smaller tonnages and MPP vessels, and the short sea market) for hosting our article. For more info on BMTI and their services please click on the image of their homepage to the right!


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