Port of Piraeus as a ‘Shipping Cluster’

Posted on June 15, 2019 by Karatzas Marine Advisors & Co.

A lot has been made of the growth of the Greek merchant fleet in the last couple of years. At a time when freight rates are anemic and shipping finance rather expensive, the world’s fleet growth has slowed down – and thankfully so. However, two merchant fleets stand out, those of Greece and of China – which they have keeping growing faster than the overall market and much faster than any other ‘national’ fleet. Some even would pointedly indicate that the German merchant fleet has shrank materially in the last few years as German banks became more aggressive unfolding ‘KG system’ vessels.

Just because the fleets of Greece (and China) grow, this does not mean that all respective shipowners in these two countries enjoy smooth sailing and are immune to the problems that shadow the international shipping industry, and Greek owners do not lose ships to bank and creditors, too; there are the individual tragedies and vessel arrests and divestments, but as a whole, the Greek fleet keeps growing.

What is that that make Greek shipping so resilient?

Definitely there is no clear and easy answer; more likely, a combination of factors are to be credited for the Greek shipping growth.

In a recent trip to Athens, in a matter of ten days, we have had the opportune chance to attend several corporate receptions and a few conferences and company-hosted seminars and presentations. For all those events, the venues were filled to capacity, which is indicative of the interest of the shipping professionals longing for such events. And, then, at all those events, the level of discussion and information provided were just amazing.

Unlike conferences in other locations that adopt a platform of regurgitating corporate press releases or speakers ‘talking their book’ and insisting presenting an artificially rosy picture of the industry, the events and conferences we attended in Greece were information- and data-driven, open to debate after the presentations, and taking a holistic approach to shipping and the need for transport, rather than being narrow-focused. We actually heard questions on the viability of modern ships and whether it’s worth replacing whole fleets on the basis on better fuel or technological options.

We are not jingoistic or nationalistic to the extent of dreaming of perfection in the Greek shipping market. There are less than stellar conferences and, and yes, people in conferences in Greece are known to pat themselves a bit on the back for the historic performance of the Greek shipping.

On the other hand, there have been so many events and presentations and conference, so much market information and intelligence, so much cross-pollination of ideas and suggestions, that a visit to Piraeus is always guaranteed to bring a shipping professional up to speed with the critical topics, hot markets, and prevailing ideas. From people with an institutional knowledge of the shipping industry, to studied Ph.D.’s and other types of eggheads to the lowly shipbrokers and traders, good quality information on both granular and macro-level is traded in a furious table-tennis fashion. We are talking about ‘primary’ information from actual transactions and deal-making, to technical information on currently discussed regulations to ‘out of the box’ business structures, that is a school on its own.

We tend to travel a lot, and attend, and present, and even host conferences worldwide, and we really enjoy it immensely, and we always get richer from business traveling and conferences; the quality and richness, however, of shipping market information that can be found on Akti Miaouli and Piraeus and wherebeaouts is just unique to Greek shipping. A trip to Piraeus is always an enjoyable crash course to catch up on business. From the famous Greek song ‘The Young Men (Children) of Piraeus’ made famous by Melina Merkouri, the lyrics come to mind: ‘However I searched, I haven’t found another harbour, to make me infatuated, as Piraeus’; the lyrics are more about love than shipping, but the simile is right on target.

Once again, it’s hard to pinpoint the resilience, and some may say success, of the Greek shipping to any factor; on the other hand, the quality of the information shipping professionals in Greece got on their hands is just amazing and rejuvenating; and, even in a slow season and a weak market, corporate events and presentations and parties and conferences keep a professional’s calendar booked beyond business hours.

If information is power (and consequently money), our recent experience in Greece may be indicative of the strength and the prospects of this unique market.

Go to Piraeus, young (shipping) man!

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A Shipping Finance Conference in Athens, a Great Success Story!

Posted on February 3, 2019 by Karatzas Marine Advisors & Co.

Profoundly thankful to the speakers, sponsors, participants and attendees for the immensely successful Slide2Open Karatzas Shipping Finance Conference 2019!

Proudly co-organized by Karatzas Marine Advisors & Co.

To access the conference website including presentations, proceedings, interviews and panel discussions, please click here!

2018 was Indeed a Forgettable Year for Shipping. Is There More to It?

Posted on November 25, 2018 by Karatzas Marine Advisors & Co.

So far in 2018, the shipping freight markets have been proven uninspiring; current freight indices produced by the Baltic Exchange, the Shanghai Shipping Exchange and other data providers are comparable to year-old levels, give or take some “normal”volatility; and, it’s well known that shipping is capable of much more than “normal”volatility.

Product tankers specifically, and tankers in general, seem to be the disappointment of the year in terms of freight – but still, as of late, crude tankers have managed a fair recovery on the back of OPEC strong production performance and changing trade patterns for crude oil. The dry bulk market have mostly been having a respectable year with profitable cashflows, with the exception of a recent dive in the capesize freight market. The containership market had been fair in the early part of the year, especially for feeder and feedermax tonnage, although, recently. only trans-Pacific freight rates seem robust as shippers are trying to front-load their cargoes to the USA in expectation of heightened tariffs in the new year.And, the offshore market, after several years of tranquility reflecting an almost dead market, in 2018 has shown signs of hope as offshore drilling projects(very) selectively having been coming back to line.

The following chart from the Baltic Exchange, to which we are a member, depicts the BalticExchange freight indices for the drybulk market (BDI), and separately for the capesize market (BCI), its most important and also most volatile component; also, the Baltic Exchange freight indices for crude(BDTI) and clean tankers (BCTI) are shown in the same graph. In order to provide more perspective, the graph incorporates both 2017 and 2018 y-t-d, showing that 2018 has been marginally better than the year before, at least for drybulk and tankers, seasonal volatility notwithstanding.

Likewise for the containership market with the Shanghai Containerized Freight Index (SCFI):

All in all, on average, freight rates for most shipping assets were hovering around cash breakeven levels for most of 2018. Operating profits have been uninspiring, mostly, for the profitable sectors, while operating losses were too small to trigger fresh bankruptcies in unprofitable sectors. Most of the shipping bankruptcies in 2018 were of “legacy assets” emanating – hard to believe – from the go-go days of the last decade. A couple more of shipping bankruptcies in 2018 were triggered from other factors such as accounting fraud– including one in the fishing industry to which we have acted as LiquidationTrustee by order of the High Court of the Republic of the Marshall Islands.

In a post from almost a year ago, we had argued that an uninspiring shipping market in 2018was the best thing the industry could have hoped for. Not that we objected to outsized profits in the shipping industry, or wished ill for those that had a “long position” in shipping. We just thought that there were too many ships on the water for the cargoes available to be shipped, and, also, we did not see a great deal of growth for those cargoes. Our position for a forgettable year, truth be told, also incorporated some wishful thinking, that an uninspiring market would prevent the players in the market from fresh excesses, such as fresh waves of newbuilding vessels, more and cheaper capital in the industry, and so forth. We are pleased that our “prediction” for a forgettable market has been proven true, and we apologize for the betrayed dreams and hopes for a much stronger recovery for the shipping industry in 2018.

A forgettable year in 2018, as a “downer” as it has been for the shipping industry, it also has, at the very least, led to a) the slowest pace of newbuilding orders in almost every asset class, b) a low outstanding orderbook for many types of vessels, and the lowest for some in recent memory, c) few new capital coming to the market to ignite d) speculation and speculative transactions. There seems to be some “normalcy”in the market and a return to the basics, of supply and demand and the following of the trade and cargoes.

As shipping freight markets are concerned, probably 2019 will not be much different than 2018. But again, there are many “drivers” and “catalysts” that can make for an exciting year in shipping in the new year in other areas than shipping.

And, holding our second shipping conference in Athens on January 24^th, 2019, we will aim to deliver, once again, profound insight from the Captains of the industry, literally and metaphorically, for the things to come in the near future!

A Wishful Port Called Consolidation

Posted on September 17, 2018 by Karatzas Marine Advisors & Co.

The maritime industry has been facing headwinds for almost a decade now: chronic tonnage oversupply, intermittent demand growth, new trading patterns, heightened level of regulations, new technologies and vessel designs, and more recently, the prospect of a global trade war. It’s not easy being a shipowner, if ever it was.

Besides the obvious “academic” solutions of self-discipline when it comes to newbuilding appetite and accelerated schedule of ship demolitions, little can be done strategically to alleviate the industry’s woes.

Since the early days of the present decade, the concept of consolidation has been mentioned as a solution with the best hope for mitigating the industry’s problems. Conceptually, fewer and bigger owners could better sustain the weak times of the industry by sharing overhead and expenses across larger fleets, by having higher fleet efficiencies, and by affording more competitive access to capital; a market dominated by fewer owners can also employ strategic efficiencies whereby fewer players would be more disciplined at ordering newbuldings and also providing a united front against the demands of charterers.

Notable names of the shipping and the finance worlds have been advocating for industry consolidation for some time now, most conspicuously then-private-equity-shipping-investor and now Commerce Secretary Wilbur Ross. Proponents of consolidation have drawn their conclusions mostly from other industries than shipping, such as the steel industry in the case of Wilbur Ross; and, there is a strong body of academic research and case studies taught at business schools supporting the case of consolidation. On the surface, consolidation has saved the steel industry from chronic losses (although ironically part of the current trade war discussion is driven by the consolidated state of the steel industry having cost thousands of jobs). Likewise, the airline industry, via consolidation (and also chronic waves of bankruptcies), have reached now a point of high utilization and profitability, as any weary traveler can attest to these days.

No doubt there are economic benefits for the players in a market that has undergone consolidation; on the other hand, we think that certain markets and industries are more prone to consolidation than others, for many reasons.

Let’s follow the empirical approach to see what has happened so far in this maritime field:

Wall Street and institutional investors are big proponents for consolidation in the shipping industry. Image credit: Karatzas Images

In the tanker market, after Frontline’s failed effort to acquire DHT, the got critical mass to defend itself by buying the BW VLCC fleet, catalyzing, in turn, Euronav’s acquisition of Gener8 Maritime (itself the product of merger of General Maritime and Navig8 Crude Tankers). There is little merger activity in the rest of the crude tanker market, with the exception of Teekay folding two “daughter” publicly-listed companies into one, and also acquiring the Principal Maritime crude tanker fleet. In the product tanker market, Scorpio Tankers acquired Navig8 Product Tankers in 2017, while recently BW took a bow with publicly listed Hafnia Tankers. If there is a lesson to be learned from merger activity in the tanker industry is that these are a handful of transactions among already sizeable players who are publicly listed and/or driven by institutional investors or financially-oriented managers behind them. The typical, average tanker owner has been least affected, or bothered, at least so far. However one slices the tanker market, there are almost 15,000 tankers of all sizes with a few thousand shipowner groups worldwide; if all these tankers and owners were to be consolidated into groups of big companies, investment bankers in shipping would be among the richest people on this planet.

In the dry bulk market, Star Bulk, publicly listed and driven by institutional investors, have been growing the size of their fleet by acquiring Augustea, Songa Bulk, and Ocean Bulk in the past. Golden Ocean acquired the Quintana capesize-focused fleet, and potentially the acquisition of the CarVal Investors dry bulk fleet by Good Bulk can be considered a case of consolidation; there are a few more meaningful transactions with privately held companies (most the Angelicoussis and Zodiac groups) acquiring massively, and surgically, shipping assets in the secondary market. There is no doubt that there has been much more S&P activity in the dry bulk, but nothing to qualify as consolidation. The dry bulk market is often described as the textbook case of perfect competition, and as such, it makes little sense to buy (and retire) dry bulk shipping companies – the companies have little to offer in excess of the stripped assets. Again, zooming out on the sector, consolidation so far seems to be with mostly sizeable companies, publicly listed, often driven by institutional investors, and almost always payment taking place – at least partially – in shares. There is still a very ‘long tail’ of small shipowners in the sector. And, there are more than 12,000 dry bulk vessels and several thousand shipowners active in the market; once again, investment bankers in shipping should be voted happiest people on earth if consolidation was ever to take hold in this market segment.

Just like consolidation in shipping, the bigger, the better… or, the sky is the limit! Image credit: Karatzas Images

Onto a shipping sector with a more disciplined structure, the containership liner market, it would appear that consolidation has offered a proven solution to this market over time; from almost thirty liner companies in existence in the early 1990’s, the number now stands at fourteen (14), a clear trend of consolidation over the last two decades. Again, there does seem to be the same consolidation pattern of this market segment: most of these companies were big companies to begin with, often publicly listed or owned / managed by sophisticated investors in a market segment with relatively high barriers to enter; nothing new here. Looking onto smaller regional market players, the market has been much more fragmented, and allegedly ripe of consolidation. Some of these regional players are publicly listed or some of them run by investors and financiers, but it’s hard to discern a consolidation pattern on the surface. Probably the transactions that stand out in this sector are those of KG owners that are driven by shipping banks to consolidate, most notably MPC Container Ships, the Zeaborn and the Claus-Peter Offen groups that have keep absorbing smaller players such as Cido (containers), E.R. Schiffhart, Rickmers Linie, Ahrenkiel, Conti, etc (some of these transactions involved also MPP vessels). And, there has been the absorption of many more smaller KG houses and vessels that popped up in the last decade jus because of the exuberance of the KG market in Germany. What all these stories of consolidation have in common, in our opinion, is that most of these target companies had their financial base completely wiped out, the management teams had no ‘skin in the game’ but mostly, German shipping bank have effectively forced ‘shotgun marriages’ (read consolidation) in this market. Otherwise, left to its own devices, it’s questionable how much consolidation would had taken place in this segment.

Despite the obvious benefits in the shipping market by a less fragmented ownership distribution, with fewer and more stable players, it’s still a very long way, in our opinion, for the industry to really get to appreciate consolidation. It’s been vividly implied in the discussion above that each segment in the shipping industry is driven by slightly different factors, but it’s abundantly clear that consolidation so far has been driven by a confluence of financial owners (this includes shipping banks) building up on the critical mass of already sizeable companies and where egos can be forced aside by the prospects of economic benefits and payouts, often in the form of paper (shares).

For the several thousands of shipowners worldwide, especially when they are the founders of shipping companies or have some sort of competitive advantage (captive cargo, access to terminals, etc), consolidation would be a tall order. Consolidation favors bigger players, but still smaller players can be shaping the market for longer than hoped for.

Darwinism in known to work, but it takes a notoriously long time; economies of scale make for more efficient shipping companies, but again, this takes time. In Darwinism, let’s not forget, some species become extinct. Probably for some shipowners, unless extinction becomes their only choice, consolidation will be getting little attention. The financial markets and shipping finance can impose their will on shipping forcefully, but likely consolidation in the shipping industry cannot be material in the near future, at least for commodity shipping.

Article originally appeared in Lloyd’s List on September 7, 2018 under the heading “Consolidation Players Go Hungry“.

Karatzas Marine and Slide2Open to Host 2nd Shipping Finance Conference in Athens on January 24th, 2019

Posted on September 13, 2018 by Karatzas Marine Advisors & Co.

Building upon the successful inaugural conference held in February 2018 at the Intercontinental Hotel in Athens, Greece, Karatzas Marine Advisors & Co and Slide2Open are thrilled to announce that next year’s conference will be held on January 24, 2019. Save the date!

An expanded agenda on shipping finance, new environmental regulations, innovation and disruption, but also analysis of international trade and geo-politics, and an alignment of speakers and thought leaders of the highest caliber in their fields, are guaranteed to render this conference a “must attend” event.

For more information, please feel free to contact us by email at: info[at] bmkaratzas[dot]com or at info[at]Slide2open[dot]net or make sure to follow our blog for regular updates, or follow the conference website at Slide2Open Shipping Finance 2019!

The Maritime Industry Hopes for Silver Lining as Talks of Tariffs Escalate

Posted on September 10, 2018 by Karatzas Marine Advisors & Co.

Talk of possible trade wars has kept executives in a wide range of industries at the edge of their seats; this is even more true for people in the maritime industry, which afterall is the hauling provider on a global scale. Trade wars imply lower trade volumes, which would be a monumental concern to the shipping industry.

The New York Stock Exchange. Image credit: Karatzas Images

Intuitively, trade wars are bad for the shipping industry; tariffs and higher barriers to trade result in lower trading volumes that lead to lower demand for ships, and that, in turn, results in lower freight rates. However, nothing is as simple anymore in today’s world: higher tariffs can also lead to disruption of established supply chains, which, in the short term at least, can mean longer and less efficient paths between manufacturers and buyers, which could mean a lengthier than normal supply chain. Talks of dismantling NAFTA, for instance, has led Mexican importers of grains to substitute imports from the U.S. with imports from other countries, primarily from countries in South America. U.S. grains to Mexico are mostly shipped from the ports of Texas and Louisiana to Veracruz in Mexico in a week’s long sailing voyage; however, Mexican imports from South America take twice as long to transport, and, all being equal, this shipping trade has been beneficial for the (international) shipowners.

Trying to assess the impact of possible trade wars on the maritime industry and try to plot an optimal strategy are in the minds of small and large shipowners alike worldwide. If a shipping company, for instance, was planning for an expensive fleet renewal, the potential of trade wars likely to be a cause to chart a new course of action. Who wants to be investing in expensive new ships when the prospects are less than rosy?

There are many permutations of possible scenarios of international trade wars as there are many variables; mostly, however, there are many theories and lines of thinking, as well as egos involved, and also grave political implications to consider, or ignore that could affect potential outcomes. On one extreme, there is the scenario for maximum tariffs on an international scale that could lead to a complete collapse of trade; at least for now, the probability for such a catastrophic scenario seems slim, thankfully. Focusing on the more likely scenario of small to moderate tariffs but where logic and economic sense would still drive decisions for the most part, it seems to be a more probable scenario.

A consideration to ponder is that the U.S. strategy so far seems targeted on imposing tariffs mostly on finished-products imported to the country, and such tariffs seem to be encompassing many industries and also being most disruptive to the supply chains; for example imports from China often have been sub-assembled in other countries and the supply chain in these countries is impacted too. China, Canada and Mexico so far seem to apply a more surgical approach by placing tariffs on mostly raw materials and commodities that concentrated political impact and relatively small collateral damage to the supply chain.

International trade bridging the seas… Image credit: Karatzas Images

Under a probable scenario of moderate tariffs and under the current modus operandi, different segments of the shipping industry will experience a varying degree of disruption. The containership industry likely to experience a direct negative impact as import containers are mostly filled with consumer and other end products. Head-haul trade routes from China, whether to the West Coast or via the Panama Canal to the East Coast of the U.S. seem to stand at bull’s eye, but the impact will percolate to other trade to Europe and other smaller traders localized trades. Earlier in the summer, there has been a noticeable increase of input volumes in U.S. ports and strong export data have been reported out of China; this positive impact has mostly been attributed to seasonality, as some of the peak season volumes were moved forward to dodge the first round of tariffs imposed in early July. The heightened trade due to timing considerations is expected to taper off and eventually volumes to tick downwards. Liner containership companies with their modern, huge boxships, especially those with focus on the China to North America trade, stand to be impacted most. Localized containership markets that feed on the main trading routes had been the bright spot of the long-challenged containership market in the last couple of years, but now there are signs that smaller feeder containerships are getting off-hire at an alarmingly high rate. It seems that pro-actively charterers opt to stop renewing charters in anticipation of reduced need for trade.

One of the great surprises in the energy world in the last decade has been the success of the shale oil production in the U.S. that potentially can make the country a net exporter for oil. Energy seemed to be getting a free pass from tariffs, but with escalating threats, now it seems to be fair game as well. China and Far East are the biggest consumers of oil these days, and slowly the success of the shale oil in the U.S. was forming into a new trade of exporting crude oil from Corpus Christi in Texas to China via supertankers (VLCCs); this potentially could had been a game-changer trade for the crude oil tanker market given the large ton-mile numbers involved and also given the overall disruption in the trading patterns for VLCCs. This trade now seems in jeopardy, although just earlier in the week it was announced that Trafigura was still considering building a deep sea oil export terminal in Texas; but again, just this week, Chinese stated-controlled Unipec was suspending oil imports from the U.S., rattling the crude tanker market. To the extent that long term contracts will be honored or competitive pricing for U.S. shale oil can be obtained, there is a scenario of petroleum product tankers benefiting from the trade as well, whereby refineries will be focusing more on export trades. The U.S. natural gas LNG trade could also be adversely impacted by tariffs, and this is most unfortunate as the LNG tanker market desperate needs some hope in chronically oversupplied market; in addition, U.S. LNG export infrastructure is still being built up, and talks of tariffs possibly will stall some of these much-hoped-for projects.

The dry bulk market seems to be least impacted from talks of tariffs as the trade concerns mostly commodities and raw material used in the first steps of industrial production. For now, these trades seem safe, and, in the case of the grain trade to Mexico mentioned earlier, and grain trade worldwide, this would be a downright positive development for the shipping industry. Tariffs on Chinese steel will eventually catch up with China’s imports of coal and ores from Australia and Brazil and could negatively affect big-sized dry bulk vessels (capesize and Newcastlemax vessels).

The shipping industry is impacted by a wide range of factors, and the impact of tariffs is not isolated or easily quantifiable, and definitely at this stage, still much is unknown on how tariffs will be applied in terms of products, levels, reciprocity or exemptions, etc; on the other hand, no doubt some shipowners will find talk of trade wars a convenient excuse to blame for the industry’s and even their own companies’ structural problems.

Shipowners internationally have maintained a sanguine approach to talks of tariffs and trade wars. To a certain extent, this is understandable as the shipping industry has proven to do better at times of conflict, high uncertainty and interrupted trading patterns. On the other hand, continuous talk of trade wars can sap investment and trade sentiment, and trading volumes, that cannot be good for shipping. Or, anyone else.

For the Shipping Industry, a Matter of Interest and Indebtedness

Posted on January 14, 2018 by Karatzas Marine Advisors & Co.

Ever since shipping banks (and banks in other industries) have been curtailing their lending to shipowners (and for other banks outside shipping to small and middle-market companies), there has been a big funding gap, a market need, that has to be filled for the economy to grow. Many credit funds or alternative capital funds have popped in shipping that lend money for those who look for financing to buy or refinance ships. On a broader scale, many brand-name private equity funds have been setting up credit funds in order to serve the market need of lack of debt financing in numerous industries; with more regulation for banks (among other things), un-regulated lenders step in to serve the market.

There are substantial differences in the way a bank evaluates a loan in shipping than a credit funds approaches the market; although effectively they both look to undertake credit risk (they both lend money), there are always more types of risk entangled around credit: asset risk, operational risk, counterparty risk, etc No doubt that credit funds, as non-regulated lenders typically, have much more flexibility of the structures and the terms of the loans they can underwrite. For starters, credit funds can also take a little or a lot of residual asset risk (balloon payments, etc), market risk (profit sharing, etc), asset risk (finance older vessels, etc), that is, they can think outside the “credit risk” box and provide commercially more flexible structures (of course, at a higher cost of capital.) Also, since credit funds are not regulated, when there is a default of a loan, there is no reporting to a regulatory body which would have consequences on ratios and strategy; a credit fund would have the precious luxury to convert late payments to equity or accept payment-in-kind (PIK) or impose a higher profit sharing scheme and eventually take over the asset, if things really go bad. To be sure, a default for a loan is a painful experience for all those involved, for the shipowner / borrower of course, and also for the financier / creditor, whether the creditor is a regulated bank or a credit fund as practically no-one wishes for such an outcome of default (unless the lender is really a niche vulture fund specializing on feeding on carcasses and liquidation, but honestly, this is the exception than the rule.)

The typical credit fund these days would charge approximately 8% interest for a first preferred ship mortgage; for some, this is expressed as annual interest in absolute terms, but for others, it’s the spread over Libor (L+800 bps), meaning that the borrower also undertakes interest rate risk (at a time when the Fed and other central banks shifting to a tightening mode.) The amount of leverage is dependable, but most likely it populates in the 60-70% range, inlying that still a respectable percentage of equity is required; of course, more equity means that the shipowner has to be selective with their projects and also that the credit risk for the creditor goes down as the percentage of equity goes up. Although some credit funds can accept a bullet payment of the principal (under certain circumstances), a certain level of amortization is required for most cases. And, there are the usual assignment of earnings, minimum value clause, minimum liquidity clause, negative covenant clauses, and also pledge of shares, undated signed director resignations, and, more frequently these days, demands for a personal or corporate guarantee. All in all, the loan terms these days seem to be the extreme opposite of the easy credit days of a decade ago of name lending and loans agreed on a handshake.

Although a few short years ago shipowners would never had conceded to a first preferred ship mortgage with an interest rate above 4-5% or other funky terms, these days there are few options, and thus the reason that 8% has become the prevailing cost of the debt for ship mortgages. Different types, different norms, as said before.

For a theoretical example of a five-year modern panamax bulker valued at $22 mil and 65% leverage and five year term, at 8% annual interest, the daily interest payment alone is appr. $3,000 per diem; presuming that there is a requirement for the principal to be amortized by 50% over the term of the facility, then another $4,000 pd had to be added to the financing payments. Based on a back-of-the-envelope assumption of $6,500 pd vessel daily operating expenses, the cash expenses for operating such a ship range from $9,500 – $13,500 pd; just as a reminder, only in the last eight months panamax freight rates sustainably moved above $10,000 pd, meaning that many borrowers, at best, they were breaking even in the last eighteen months. Of course, there is the hope for higher asset prices and higher freight rates, but, as they say, hope does not make for a good business plan. This model of 8% cost of debt financing would never work with modern, expensive ships (as the interest payment would become exorbitant in today’s freight market), while older tonnage (to the extent that a credit fund can be enticed enough to consider it) has more favorable economics.

There are a few corollaries to the prevailing market practices that need come elaboration:

the cost of debt financing has moved to such high levels that it’s barely economically feasible to undertake new projects or buy ships for the smaller, independent shipowner
borrowers undertake severe interest rate risk at a time when interest rates are moving higher (unlike a shipping bank with its interest rate swap desk that offered a full package, credit funds do not offer such service, and the borrower has to search a dis-incentivized market for this product for effectively project finance and small amounts)
there is a lot of risk for both the borrower and the creditor under such scenario of high interest rates, and it will not take much for many of these financing projects to be underwater, so to speak
as several more tight covenants have been added to these types of loans, in the event of defaults, it can be really ugly; if the overall market turns south (an unlikely scenario for now, but as we have learned, in shipping even unlikely scenarios are probable), there will be a massive cascading problem (credit funds will not be as cavalier as shipping banks with arresting ships, but then how they would be operating them or sell them in a declining market?)
with so many credit funds having been set up for shipping, potentially there could be the possibility of them having to compete and lowering their standards in order to gain business; we are well aware of at least one credit fund that between April and October 2016 made a complete U-turn on their credit underwriting as they could not get one deal done.
as cost of debt financing is too high, many financial sources keep looking entering the market which likely would undermine the credit fund market; we are working with a Chinese-originating fund providing first preferred ship mortgages at 5% interest for 50-60% leverage and very normalized covenants.
disappointedly, for credit funds being private equity funds and well versed in structured finance, their proposed structures are extremely monolithic and inflexible, which will cost them a lot over the long term; being unregulated and flexible, only imagination could limit structures where they could make big returns if they were willing to be flexible and exchange some credit risk for some market risk and some asset risk and some residual risk and some counterparty risk and some… All credit funds have been pigeon-holed into credit, they compete heads-one with every other credit fund, and the only reason they do business now is that shipping is desperate for capital; this market could easily move away. But again, most of these credit funds have been run by former shipping bankers with some trying to exonerate themselves for the shipping bank mistakes of the last decade…

For now for sure, shipping debt is an interest-ing market to watch…

For some, a foggy market… One World Trade Center in Downtown Manhattan. Image credit: Karatzas Images

Shipping’s Best Hope of Forgettable Years

Posted on January 11, 2018 by Karatzas Marine Advisors & Co.

By all accounts, 2017 was a forgettable year for shipping – which it may be the best characterization the industry could possibly have at present. Recent memorable years in shipping have not been very uplifting. Probably many people in the industry are still struggling to forget 2016 and its 296 BDI and 161 Capesize readings in March of that year, the lowest ever readings by the Baltic Exchange.

2017 was rather good for dry bulk (pleasantly great if one opts to compare it to an abysmal 2016) while tankers, containerships and offshore were mildly disappointing markets. Shipping segments are not often in sync with each other and segment gyrations are to be expected. Although the fundamentals driving each segment differ nominally, there have been a few common underlying trends across segments at present: the outstanding orderbook has been low in each and every segment, actually the lowest in recent memory. Tonnage demand keeps increasing on the strength of global economic growth. Tonnage supply keeps growing but at lower levels, so much so that tonnage demand hesitantly exceeds tonnage supply growth in certain markets. And, lack of shipping finance negatively affects all segments of the industry, further curtailing the possibility for an exorbitant wave of newbuildings. When one examines shipping closely, as a pure tonnage supply and demand equilibrium, 2018 and the near future seem rather promising.

However, shipping is an industry known to get people by surprise and looking forward there are reasons for a market participant to be concerned. Several factors, complimentary to the industry, are cause for concern; probably not as bad as to make the proverbial list “what keep’s you awake at night” but again, not an era of assured smooth sailing.

The shipping finance market has been dysfunctional for the last few years, but at present, the dislocation in the market is reaching unprecedented levels. As traditional shipping banks keep leaving the industry and institutional investors have lost any interest in private equity investments and some public market investments as well, the cost of capital keeps increasing steadily. It’s not unheard of for independent shipowners to be borrowing at 8% spread for first preferred ship mortgages with tight covenants and terms these days. For a capital intensive industry, the high cost of capital is an accident waiting to happen for shipowners and financiers alike. Also, lack of debt financing is shifting the market, even forcing smaller players to shut down and slowly driving a consolidation wave. Probably too soon to notice any immediate effect in 2018, but watching the Greek and German markets over the last few years, one can note the trend forming.

Many hopeful shipping business plans and corporate presentations pride on the industry’s low outstanding orderbook. It’s absolutely marvelous that shipowners have shown self-discipline in the last few years and abstained from speculative orders; however, the counter-argument is that shipbuilders are immediately ready for new orders and can deliver new ships as soon as within nine months. Low outstanding orderbook implies plenty of spare shipbuilding capacity. And, while there has been talk about inconsequential Chinese shipbuilders getting weeded out in the last couple of years, the truth of the matter is that shipbuilding capacity is highly elastic and all those now defunct shipbuilders would be entering again the market the minute that hot new orders start arriving. It’s a good thing that institutional investors and shipowners have lost interest in “speculative” newbuilding orders, but a strong freight market could likely incite many new orders that can start flooding the market very soon and thwarting a full market recovery. Barring an exogenous stimulus such as export credit incentives or materially lower newbuilding contract prices, a “forgettable” and un-inspiring freight market may be the safest way of navigating these narrow shoals.

While when talking about shipping the focus is on freight rates and asset prices, one cannot neglect the regulatory and operational nature of the business. The ballast water treatment management plants (BWMS) have already been costing the industry additional capital, and new emissions regulations are fast afoot. New regulations are costing the industry billions of dollars when the industry can poorly afford them, and one would expect even tighter standards going forward. Higher standards for vessel performance, tighter standards for safety and security, likely soon IT security to make ships relatively secure from hacking and ransomware, and all these, before one takes into consideration technological obsolescence factors: if for instance natural gas bunkering is the way of the future, what would happen to today’s modern world fleet? We do not want to be the Cassandras and the pessimists of the business, but one has to think about the long future very hard when ordering vessels that have twenty-five years of design life.

Further, while the vessels themselves can be the subject to higher standards and technological obsolesce, how about the cargoes and the underlying trading trends themselves? The cost of producing solar and wind energy has been dropping precipitously and jeopardizing the importance of coal, and possibly crude oil, as the world’s primary energy sources. Electric cars have slowly been passing the “novelty” phase of new products and becoming mainstream that would further impact the energy transport market. And, as shale oil and natural gas keeps improving lowering its production cost, likely to be less need for transport. Probably an isolated example, but the current polar wave of freezing weather in North America barely registered on the crude tanker market; there was a time when crude tanker rates were shooting skywards as charterers were scrambling to import more oil to the US to cover increased energy demand every time there was a cold front in North America. Energy trends take a long time to materialize, but on the other hand, one cannot dismiss that a new baseline that’s forming for the immediate and distant future.

We do not want to be pessimists and do not want to be the ones who are pointing to a half-empty glass. 2017 has been a respectable year, and, with a bit of good luck, 2018 would be equally fair. After many years of persistent fireworks in the industry, some “forgettable” years would be a welcome change. But just like navigating in unchartered waters, one has to keep paying attention to the dangers lurking in the ambient environment and under the surface of the sea.

A Happy New Year to all, especially the seafarers in the middle of the ocean an away from their families!

Happy Shipping and Happy New Year! Virginia Beach, VA. Image credit: Karatzas Images

An edited version of this article first appeared on Splash 24/7 on January 3rd, 2018, under the heading “A forgettable year is our best option”.

Sailing the Seas Depends on the Helmsman

Posted on December 10, 2017 by Karatzas Marine Advisors & Co.

Once upon a time, there was an independent shipowner with, let’s say, ten modern product tankers. Three of their tankers were mortgaged with a major European bank, a very well-known name and with proven past commitment to the shipping industry. And, the shipowner themselves, have been in the shipping business for more than a couple of decades and enjoying a solid reputation in the shipping community and with charterers. These, being legacy shipping loans, their terms were highly competitive in this market despite some success of the bank to tighten the loan terms since the market collapse a few years ago. Actually, the terms of these loans were exceptional, by today’s standards, as the spread was just 300 basis points. And, of course, the shipowner had watched these loans like the apple of their eye, and they were current with interest payments and principal repayments and the loans were comfortably meeting the loan-to-value (LTV) covenants.

Eighteen months ago, the shipowner got a note from their mortgage bank that since they (the bank) were exiting the shipping industry, the shipowner was given notice to make arrangements to pay back the loans (there was a small discount offered) or the bank would had to take matters in their own hands. Since these were performing loans, the mortgage bank could sell the loans at close to par, likely to a credit fund or an institutional investor, or possibly even to another bank if there were still banks out there buying shipping loans – not a likely cozy prospect under any circumstances.

It took a few months for the shipowner to recover from the first shock, having a brand-name bank giving them notice on performing loans. And, it only got worse from there. The shipowner’s shock got greater as soon as they started “shopping” the market for new financing: few shipping banks had interest in new clients or business or the capacity to finance a three-vessel package. While approaching institutional investors, the strategy was modified to squeeze the mortgage bank for a hefty discount of the loans, but with the institutional investors sharing (a great deal of) the economics of the transaction and not just to provide new loans. Almost a year passed since the mortgage bank had given notice and the shipowner could not find a new “deal” good enough. But again, having to replace shipping loans priced at L+300 bps in today’s market, one feels like they have been punched in the stomach.

And, while the shipowner was taking their sweet time to find the perfect financing they thought they deserved, the product tanker freight market started deteriorating: first freight rates dipped and then halved, and, as one would expect, secondary market product tanker sales started taking place at lower price levels. While the shipowner had a few million in cash in the bank, dry-dockings and other expenses started chipping away on the balances. And, the lower asset prices triggered LTV defaults now, giving much more leeway to the bank to sell the vessels themselves, and not just the loans – an even worse prospect for the shipowner.

And, lower freight rates and lower asset prices were making financing the original loans more difficult: cash flows now would only support lower financing, and institutional investors lost appetite since any discount now had less value in a weakening market.

All being told, the shipowner managed to finance just two of the vessels at today’s prevailing conditions (lower leverage, tighter covenants and cost in excess of L+600 bps.) And, the third vessel was let go and was sold (at a small loss) since no financing could be found within the parameters of a weak freight market and limited “sweat equity” from the shipowner.

This is a real story (unfortunately) and no names or other details can be divulged; but, such details do not matter really. If there are lessons to be learned is that first, in this market, shipping finance is the “determining factor” of the shipping industry, the independent shipowners. Shipping finance is the new battlefield where shipowners will be called to fight; if they cannot sort out their shipping finance game in the new market, they will be driven out of business – as simple as that. Second, in this difficult market, it’s not only “bad shipowners” who have problems; if your bank is not committed to shipping or you or they are having higher priorities unrelated to shipping, that’s the weakest link in the business, even if the loans are good and performing. Third, it pays to be pro-active in this market and tie loose ends as soon as possible; looking for the perfect financing at the expense of time, one can lose much more than a few hundred basis points – not arguing that two hundred basis points are not worth fighting for, but again, this is not a time when banks and lenders can bend much, if at all. And, lastly, independent shipowners had become a substantial part of the industry based on their shipping and operational expertise and efficiencies and not on their financial expertise (shipping banks were lending in the past liberally and just on the basics of how to extend credit); the present market is much more sophisticated than that and hiring competent shipping advisors may very well be warranted; trying to avoid paying an advisory fee can cost one whole ships.

“Sailing the Seas Depends on the Helmsman” was a revolutionary, patriotic song for Mao Zedong’s Red Guards in the 1960’s and 1970’s exemplifying the Chairman’s leadership skills, metaphorically speaking. For an independent shipowner these days, sailing the seas depends on the helmsman navigating the new reality of the shipping finance markets.

A long shadow over one of world’s most important shipping cluster. Image credit: Karatzas Images

Is the Dry Bulk Tramp Shipping Industry at an Inflection Point?

Posted on December 3, 2017 by Karatzas Marine Advisors & Co.

As punishingly brutal as the shipping industry can be in bad times, it’s fulfillingly rewarding in good times. Who can forget the days from a decade ago when capesize bulkers were earning $250,000 per diem and the ships themselves were changing hands in excess of $150 million? We are a long way from those good old days but memories of and even hopes for prompt arrival of great times keep many a shipowner persevering in this business. It’s known that sweet memories and often hopes have on occasion been used to spruce up many “investment theses” in investment presentations.

The dry bulk tramp trade – whereby ships do not sail on a fixed schedule or published ports of call – has long been considered a textbook case of perfect competition in economics with its low barriers to entry and exit, minimal government and regulatory interference and taxation, an international market of price-takers for an un-differentiated product where no individual player – whether shipowner or charterer – has controlling influence on the market.

In such an individualistic market environment, fortunes have been made – and occasionally lost – when independent shipowners took timely risks and positioned their companies favorably on the dramatic upswing of the business cycle. Now that the dry bulk market is closer to the bottom than the peak of the cycle, there are calls to take risks for a market upswing.

Probably the timing is opportune for buying bulkers in expectations of an upswing in the market but one has to consider whether the dry bulk tramp market still is a market adhering to the rules of a perfectly competitive market. The last decade has seen many fundamental changes in the market that one has to wonder whether the old playbook is still working.

The greatest barrier to entry the shipping industry has been capital, given that this is a capital intensive industry. However, in past times shipping banks were providing generous financing in terms of financial gearing (leverage) and covenants, and even there have been cases of “name lending” and financing agreed on a handshake. Now that shipping banks have been departing the industry, and with the capital markets veering away from project finance and commodity shipping, private equity and other institutional investors have been depended upon to provide capital to shipping but at a much higher cost of capital, tighter terms and covenants and often for a share of the economics. The barriers to entry in terms of accessing capital have definitely been affecting the industry in an adverse way, in this respect.

In reference to government interference and regulation, for vessels having open registries (flags of convenience), the burden is still low in comparison to other onshore industries, but one can see the writing on the wall of higher regulation (and higher costs.) Emissions and the quality of bunker fuel have been making headline news in the last year resulting in both a higher financial component to the business and also technological and regulatory risk. Likewise for ballast water treatment plans, past the official deadlines, technology and approvals only now are getting sorted out. Likely, there will be higher risks for safety and security and ensuring that ships and the seaways supply chain are supported by hack-free systems (ransomware NotPetya have cost Maersk a few hundred million in losses in their last quarterly report, while the possibility of “hacked” ships became a prominent scenario in a recent wave of collisions involving US Navy ships in the Pacific.) And, while offshore registered vessels are taxed on the so-called “tonnage tax” system, many revenue-challenged jurisdictions and taxpayers have been taking a second look on the substantial differential in taxation in reference to domestically registered shipping companies and the potential loss of revenue. Taxation is a risk routinely mentioned in the prospectuses of all publicly listed companies in the US-capital markets and that the current favorable treatment by the IRS cannot always considered to be “a sure thing”. Thus, in an increasingly burdensome era of regulations (environment, safety, security, etc) and taxation, another of the legs of perfect competition seems challenged.

In theory, the “product” that dry bulk shipping companies “sell” is a “commodity” and “interchangeable” as all dry bulk shipping companies offer the service of transporting cargoes in bulk over the sea; as simple as that. And, although there are many charterers who only care for the basic good of cheap transport, an ever increasing number of quality charterers demand more than the “basic” service of transport: they demand quality ships and proper management systems and real time reporting and accountability, and also solid shipowners and managers free of financial risk of default. Thus, the “product” of the tramp dry bulk shipping slowly becomes less commoditized and more of a “service” whereby now ships and shipowners are not exactly interchangeable. Quality ships run by quality managers are preferred by charterers, but they still earn market price; and, in order to be profitable at market prices, critical mass of a fleet is required in order to access capital and also spread the overhead among a larger number of vessels. Thus, another tenet of the perfect competition model that dry bulk is a “commodity” good is slowly challenged.

At the end of the day, dry bulk shipowners in the tramp trade are “price takers” and will take what the market pays as there is little pricing power; again, a perfect competition characteristic. However, the case of just buying cheap ships and wait for the market to recovery will not necessarily hold true in this new market environment. One has to wonder whether the tramp dry bulk market, as a precursor to other asset classes – is slowly approaching an inflection point where “value added” services would be a differentiating factor.

“Hope is a good thing, maybe the best of things, and no good thing ever dies”, as the quote goes, but one may has to start thinking that just hope alone of a market recovery similar to recoveries in previous business cycles may not be the case.

Article was originally was published on The Maritime Executive under the title “Is The Dry Bulk Tramp Market at an Inflection Point?” on December 1st, 2017.

Dry bulk vessel about to go under a bridge. Image credit: Karatzas Images

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