Good Old Days for Shipping

The dry bulk freight market has put an impressive performance of late; the Baltic Dry Index (BDI) has tripled since reaching bottom in February. Now, dry bulkers are in cashflow positive territory, sufficient to cover daily operating expenses (OpEx) and, partially, the financial cost. On the other hand, for tankers, it’s a different story, as tanker freight rates have dropped significantly with primarily shale oil being the game changer; but still, in cash flow positive territory.

On the sale & purchase front, there has been strong demand by buyers for bulker vessels; demand for tankers has been lackluster on the other hand. Prices for bulkers have improved in the last several months by as much as 30% for certain types of vessels. Prices for tankers, on the other hand, have been softening. All along, shipping finance is getting ever more difficult to source; and more expensive.

mv-panangia-tinou-4-bmk_9135

A listing ship and a church. Probably a good reflection of shipping today: lots of troubles and prayers in the same port… Image credit: Karatzas Images

Buying interest for vessels earlier this year had been dominated by a handful of big players who either had raised funds or had their own deep pockets to depend on. Such buyers have bought most of the quality, modern expensive (in absolute terms) ships that owners were forced to sell when the market was abysmal and cash flows were negative. Now, we see a great deal of buying interest from smaller shipowner who have to depend on expensive financing to acquire vessels and who actually will have to stretch themselves for acquisitions, even for still cheap at today’s prices – by historical levels. We have seen buyers putting all the resources together tightly to buy one or two vessels but with little cash reserves on the side for a rainy day. These are the typical speculative buyers who try to time the market by buying low and selling high, and who trade their vessels on the spot market in the interim.

If one were to ‘grade’ buying interest, the strong buying interest at present is definitely of low quality. Earlier in the year, there were substantial buyers with deep pockets buying several sistership vessels or fleets of vessels. Now, small players with no strategic or competitive advantage, with thin pockets and lots of dependence on luck and circumstance are looking to buy a cheap vessel here or a cheap vessel there. Now that freight rates have been improving and the market seems to breathe again some sign of life, they all rush to ride the wave. For bulkers it’s a ‘buy’ mode, but for tankers it’s a ‘stay away’ mode as in the latter market rates have going south and the momentum has been evaporating. All in all, a highly speculative approach to the shipping market, especially by the weaker hands who borrow expensively and they bet that the market will turn around sooner than their short runway will disappear.

We view with concern the recent resurgence of buying interest in the dry bulk market and the flip side, the absence of interest for the tanker market. Buying interest is not driven by access to cargoes or fundamental analysis of stronger demand; it’s mostly predicated on the fact that dry bulk vessels are cheap and the freight market is improving, at least in the short term. Pure speculation without much analysis; honestly, we are not the ones to judge on that, if that’s how one wishes to apply a market model. On the other hand, speculation has brought much of the present tonnage oversupply from owners who were ordering them to shipyards that were building them to shipping banks that were financing them.

Having experienced a cashflow negative market for almost two years which saw many shipowners burn their cash to survive or seen their vessels ‘re-allocated’ by the banks, the amount of speculative action in the market is scary. We appreciate that shipping and volatility (and speculation) go hand-in-hand, but one would had thought that two years of bleeding should had taught a lesson or two.

A sign of froth in the stock market is when small investors get all their little savings together and step to open a brokerage account and try to participate in a rally, buying odd lots of shares, and trying to ride the tail of the wave. It’s interpreted that when weak hands get the itch for speculation and getting sucked in, it’s when one knows that there is little more money to be pulled into the vortex.

We are all for entrepreneurship and active capitalism, but buy because ‘ships are cheap and the market will recover’ is not always the best business plan. Typically assets that are out-of-favor will again be back in favor, no doubt, but there is more to the story in order to make money by other than just speculating. Otherwise, it seems a sucker’s game.


This article was first published on the Seatrade Maritime News under the title: “Is it really the right time to buy ships?” on November 28, 2016. We’d like to thank them for their finding it worth publishing on their esteemed website!

© 2013 – present Basil M Karatzas & Karatzas Marine Advisors & Co.  All Rights Reserved.


IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER:  Access to this blog signifies the reader’s irrevocable acceptance of this disclaimer. No part of this blog can be reproduced by any means and under any circumstances, whatsoever, in whole or in part, without proper attribution or the consent of the copyright and trademark holders of this website. Whilst every effort has been made to ensure that information here within has been received from sources believed to be reliable and such information is believed to be accurate at the time of publishing, no warranties or assurances whatsoever are made in reference to accuracy or completeness of said information, and no liability whatsoever will be accepted for taking or failing to take any action upon any information contained in any part of this website.  Thank you for the consideration.

Basil M Karatzas and Karatzas Marine Advisors Quoted in the News

The shipping industry has been maintaining a very active profile in the mainstream international business press. Major bankruptcies, reorganizations, merges, vessel arrests and auctions are daily routine these days. Shipping banks, shipping loans actively and non performing loans (NPL) along with provisions are of concern or interest to many.  And, the  freight market that keeps surprising in terms of volatility.

We are delighted that Karatzas Marine Advisors & Co., and its founder Basil M Karatzas have become the contact to have for shipping market expertise; with prompt access to market information and a vast network and access to senior executives worldwide, in the shipping industry and several complimentary industries, the company has had a front row seat to today’s developments in the maritime industry and has been enjoying an active deal-flow and the trust of many in the shipping industry.

Dry-Bulk Shipping Owners Get Reprieve as Rates Rebound
(Wall Street Journal, November 24, 2016)

What Will Save the Shipping Industry? Eight Industry Thoughts Leaders Weigh In   (LLoyd’s List, November 17, 2016)

Taiwan Approves $1.9 Billion Aid Package to Troubled Shipping Companies
(Wall Street Journal, November 16, 2016)

Varsler shippinghavari (translated as ‘Warning Signs for Shipping’)
Dagens Næringsliv, (November 11, 2016 – In Norwegian)

Τα απόνερα από την εκλογή Τραμπ
(Η Ναυτεμπορικἠ, November 10, 2016 – In Greek)

Israel’s Zim Looking to Sell Most Global Shipping Operations
(Wall Street Journal, November 4, 2016)

Japan’s Largest Shipping Firms to Merge Container Operations
(Wall Street Journal, October 31, 2016)

Offen Group Selling Two MR Tankers
(Lloyd’s List, October 25, 2016)

Pressure on German shipping lenders unlikely to ease
(The Financial Times, September 21, 2016)

Guest Voices: Shipping Banks Face Sinking Prospects as They Postpone Reckoning
(Wall Street Journal, September 19, 2016)

It’s not over – Shipping industry adapting to difficult times
(Wärtsilä, September 12, 2016)

Shipping industry not buoyed by low fuel costs
(The Cayman Islands Journal, June 1, 2016)

mv-king-basil-10-bmk_2987

Aptly named containership vessel MV ‘King Basil’ departing the port of Piraeus. Image credit: Karatzas Images

© 2013 – present Basil M Karatzas & Karatzas Marine Advisors & Co.  All Rights Reserved.

IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER:  Access to this blog signifies the reader’s irrevocable acceptance of this disclaimer. No part of this blog can be reproduced by any means and under any circumstances, whatsoever, in whole or in part, without proper attribution or the consent of the copyright and trademark holders of this website. Whilst every effort has been made to ensure that information here within has been received from sources believed to be reliable and such information is believed to be accurate at the time of publishing, no warranties or assurances whatsoever are made in reference to accuracy or completeness of said information, and no liability whatsoever will be accepted for taking or failing to take any action upon any information contained in any part of this website.  Thank you for the consideration.

2016-11nov10-naftemporiki-%cf%84%ce%b1-%ce%b1%cf%80%ce%bf%ce%bd%ce%b5%cf%81%ce%b1-%ce%b1%cf%80%ce%bf-%cf%84%ce%b7%ce%bd-%ce%b5%ce%ba%ce%bb%ce%bf%ce%b3%ce%b7-%cf%84%cf%81%ce%b1%ce%bc

Hanjin’s History Lessons

‘Time is the longest distance between two places’ concludes the Tennessee Williams’ character at the end of the play The Glass Menagerie. For a large number of creditors, vendors, tonnage providers, and predominantly shippers – with $14 billion worth of merchandise packed in containers onboard Hanjin ships, this philological expression was a very hard lesson to put to practice when the company filed for receivership at the end of August.  At present, and with everything going well, the best estimate is that Hanjin’s vessels will be unloaded by the end of October. A very long time indeed for shipping containers ‘lost’ between ports at today’s age.

hanjin-monaco-manhattan-aug2014-dsc_6095

In better days… Image credit: Karatzas Images

The developments with Hanjin are still work-in-progress that may take several months, if not years, to settle permanently. For now, it’s a logistical nightmare bordering a legal saga that, in turn, stands on the periphery of the self-feeding financial crisis. Each one of these three parallel worlds will have to run their own course and trajectory, but again, not too far apart from each other. Definitely many lessons beg be learned once all is said and done, and the containers get delivered and the bills get paid, eventually. The fact that Hanjin Shipping has been the largest containership liner company bankruptcy ever (the second biggest was that of the United States Lines in 1986, when the boxship world was still in its infancy) will provide plenty of lessons on where the ‘stress points’ are in the system and the supply chain, and would provide some insight on whether the containership liner industry is a ‘systemic’ industry to the world’s trade.  There have been numerous financial restructurings and bankruptcies in shipping since the crisis ensued in 2008, but almost all of them were in the dry bulk and tanker sectors, where the logistical head-scratchers were much easier to address: usually there is one charterer or cargo owner per vessel per voyage in the dry bulk and tanker markets and not the plethora of cargoes and shippers and vendors with their boxes onboard a containership.

While it will take time to know the fine detail of the numerous parts interacting together in the liner business, a perfunctory view of the case, based on info available so far, indicates that all the factors one would expect to see in the cause of a default in the shipping industry were present in the Hanjin case.

The company, going after market and trying to keep up with the main players in the market, had effectively became a house of cards in terms of over-leverage, financially and operationally. Almost one hundred vessels (out of the 140 vessels under management) were chartered in, effectively with off-balance sheet, non-recourse financing. When the banks and lenders stop lending when one’s balance sheet gets stretched, an ambitious shipowner can just turn to the charter market and can pile up abundantly on tonnage based on their ‘signature’ and their (unsecured) promise to pay. No more than that is needed. Just a ‘sterling’ name and a ‘first class client’, as the saying goes, can be of enough assurance for charter payments and place a tall house a cards in short order. This was once a big deal even back then in 2008, for those who recall.

And, there were plenty of companies and shipowners who had been just happy to offer their tonnage on long term charters to Hanjin, just to show to their own shareholders and lenders that they had cash flow visibility and they were not speculators. Nice long charters with juicy cash-flows that paid until they stopped, that is. It may be worth asking whether such business practice was the result of poor risk management or just a case when no-one really questions whether the emperor may be naked. ‘If so many other tonnage providers had found Hanjin to be a quality charterer, who am I to stop chartering to them vessels’, one almost may be able to hear in a boardroom discussion.

mv-hanjin-namu-7-bmk_7809

When days were great… Image credit: Karatzas Images

And, Hanjin was not just any charterer. They had real substance since they were a liner company and had access to the end user. If things turned bad for the market, as they did indeed, Hanjin would have cargoes to move and keep the ships busy and therefore keep making the lease and charter-hire payments. They had access to their own terminals (at least partially), and they had preferential access to S. Korea’s promising and export-oriented economy, and thus, they were supposed to have a backstop if things were to get ugly. As we learn now, a bad market is a bad market and it burns cash for stand-alone owners but also burns cash for strategic owners, like Hanjin, too. Notions of an end-user charterer are great, but again, a bad market can pinch sharply enough to make the pain felt on the bone of an end-user.

And, Hanjin was part of a substantial industrial conglomerate with strategic access to the ‘system’, that is the government and the state banks; it had to, as being a chaebol company, they had the implicit ‘put option’ of the government itself. And beautifully this was played until when the cash burn topped US$ 2 million per diem, and all the constituents had to look for alternative solutions. You can support a company-in-need for so long, but again, all love in this world has to have some limits.  And with Hyundai Merchant Marine (HMM), the local competitor, reaching the restructuring altar in the summer first, there were one too many brides afterwards. There are still many more containership and liner companies that could be considered to have a quasi-government guarantee worldwide. Caveat emptor.

As much as we would like to believe that the Hanjin case will be an example to be held, one has to be doubtful. Time and again, defaults happen in shipping with almost metronomic frequency, and all the times, the same old factors drive those shipping companies to the ground, or the bottom of the sea for that matter: aggressiveness, over-leverage, poor risk management, over-reliance on fundamental assumptions that turn out to be fundamentally wrong, and wishful thinking.

But again, if it were not for all these surprises, shipping would be just any other boring industry. One-dimensional with ships floating beautifully over the ocean. Apparently, there is the dimension of time, at least until one gets their container delivered.


The article above was first published on Splash 247 under the heading ‘Hanjin’s Longest Voyage Yet’ on October 17, 2016.


© 2013 – present Basil M Karatzas & Karatzas Marine Advisors & Co.  All Rights Reserved.

IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER:  Access to this blog signifies the reader’s irrevocable acceptance of this disclaimer. No part of this blog can be reproduced by any means and under any circumstances, whatsoever, in whole or in part, without proper attribution or the consent of the copyright and trademark holders of this website. Whilst every effort has been made to ensure that information here within has been received from sources believed to be reliable and such information is believed to be accurate at the time of publishing, no warranties or assurances whatsoever are made in reference to accuracy or completeness of said information, and no liability whatsoever will be accepted for taking or failing to take any action upon any information contained in any part of this website.  Thank you for the consideration.

Moral Hazard and Hanjin Shipping

Not a week has passed since we posted an article on the Maritime Executive’s website about moral hazard in shipping, and the shipping world got a big-proportions, real-life case study of the risks in the industry. We argued that when shipowners are over their heads in debt and with little promise of ever recovering any equity, there is precious little they care about financing, operations, trade, safety and even the environment.

Hanjin Shipping, based in South Korea and world’s seventh biggest containership company, filed for protection in S. Korean courts in late August, and subsequently started filing for protection in several jurisdictions worldwide, including in the United States federal bankruptcy court (filing for Chapter 15 restructuring in Newark, NJ). As of the end of second quarter this year in June, the company had outstanding obligations close to US$ 5.5 billion, approximately US$ 900 million of which due by the end of 2017. There were approximately US$ 700 million in equity on the balance sheet. Hanjin stands as the manager of appr. 142 vessels, 98 of which are containerships and 44 are tankers and bulkers. Only one-fourth of Hanjin’s fleet is self-owned, 38 of them owned and the rest chartered in from leasing companies and other financially-minded shipowners. The ownership mix of the tonnage indicates more of a light-asset, trading company rather an asset-heavy, ship-owning balance sheet. The current value of the owned fleet stands at appr. US$ 1.7 billion.

hanjin-monaco-verrazzano-bridge-aug2014-kma-dsc_6132

Shipping crossing a bridge… Image Credit: Karatzas Images

Many details are still too opaque and covered by bilateral non-disclosure agreements, but where several of the counterparties have been publicly listed companies, one can draw certain conclusions: Hanjin had chartered in two 2010-built capsize vessels from publicly listed Navios Maritime Partners (ticker: NNA) MV ‘Navios Luz’ and MV ‘Navios Buena Ventura’ at a daily rate of US$ 29,356 pd each; the average spot capesize market was barely $6,000 pd during the last year, and presuming that Hanjin was trading the vessels on the spot market, they were losing $23,000 every single day for the last year ; of each of the two vessels. That is $16 mil down the drain for the two vessels in just the last year alone; each of the vessels had more than four years of employment remaining with the shipowner, and presuming that the spot capesize market would remain at present levels, Hanjin would had to suffer another $90 mil in losses for just these two vessels. Eight containerships chartered in from Danaos (ticker: DAC) had charter payment obligations of appr. $565 million. Similarly, three neo-panamax containerships from Seaspan (ticker: SSW) had outstanding charter obligations of close to US$ 370 million. These charter obligations add up to close to US$ 900 million, and under present market conditions, reasonable estimates would be for losses of more than US$ 500 million. And these are the calculations based on publicly available information for only thirteen of the 100+ vessels chartered-in, with only three counterparties. There are un-accounted obligations for more than eighty vessels that have been chartered in from other owners.

$23,000 losses every single day in the last year for each of the two capes chartered from Navios. Talk about destruction of value!

What options such a ‘shipowner’ like Hanjin (effectively a structured house of cards) does have under the circumstances? As one would suspect, very few. There is little in matter of equity, there is little in matter of collateral, there is lots of debt, and mostly, most of the debt is in relatively unsecured position since it’s in the form of charter obligations for the vessels that have been contracted on charter arrangements.

Playing the devil’ advocate and ask surreal but economically oriented questions: How much vested interest the shipowner has in the assets and the business? Precious little, at this stage. What are the odds that they will recover any equity? Probably better than hitting the jackpot in a national lottery, which we all know is not a fair proposition. What would any rational economic being would do? Briefly, either ask for the mercy of their creditors, or, having little to lose, just stop paying the creditors and pass the buck to the other side. What we called moral hazard in the previous posting.

Hanjin had been rumored (along with their co-patriot Hyundai Merchant Marine (HMM)) to be facing financial problems and was an accident waiting to happen. HMM, being slicker, and faster, and part of a big chaebol (traditional corporate conglomerate structure in S. Korea, strongly affiliated with family management style and running businesses deemed strategically important to the State, in exchange of the State’s preferential treatment), managed in August to find their way out of their financial ‘pickle’. When Hanjin tried to secure the consent and more financing from their lenders (mostly Korean banks and the state-owned Korean Development Bank), there was little empathy. This would make perfect sense, as their lenders were in relatively preferred senior position, and any new financing would be considered either ‘throwing good money after bad money’ or diluting their position and getting lower on the seniority scale of claimants. It would make economic sense to refuse any new financing and let the un-secured creditors (that is the shipowners of the hundred vessels on charter to Hanjin, like Navios, Diana, Seaspan) accept a less demanding solution. Again, Hanjin and their prime financiers decided to drop the moral hazard bomb to the parties with a lower legal claim, the shipowners of the vessels.

hanjin-monaco-manhattan-aug2014-dsc_6095

The good times left behind… Image Credit: Karatzas Images

Hanjin Shipping is the seventh containership company in the world but with only appr. 3% market, thus, belonging in the lower tier of containership companies as compared to behemoths like Moeller Maersk, Cosco, MSC and CMA CGM. A default by Hanjin cannot be expected to have a major domino effect on the overall shipping or containership world markets. The majority of Hanjin’s lenders were Korean banks, including the Korean Development Bank (KDB), and the Korean banking system (and the Korean taxpayer, if so required) can absorb the losses without posing a systemic risk to the Korean economy, at least at this stage. Hanjin had been a major carrier for LG electronics, but again, even Hanjin’s demise could not be detrimental to LG and the Korean electronics and manufacturing industries; not to mention, since HMM’s successful restructuring in the summer, now there has been an alternative, an alternative based in Korea itself (subsequent reports state the LG has already been shifting their shipment contracts to HMM). Thus, once the situation was ‘ring fenced’ and a fall-out was determined to be contained, Hanjin and its main creditors stopped paying to the lower standing creditors (other shipowners with charter-in tonnage). An example of moral hazard in all its glory.

Hanjin has filed for restructuring (and not for liquidation) expecting to find a way to save the company as a going concern over the long term. However, owners of vessels on charter to Hanjin, companies like Danaos, Seaspan, Navios and many other smaller, private owners, stand to lose the most. In an oversupplied market of low freight rates, it will be difficult to withdraw their vessels from Hanjin and seek equally profitable charter rates elsewhere in the present market; likely, they will have to accept lower and extended rates that Hanjin will offer them, and possibly some equity upside if and when the company recovers. Otherwise, the shipowners will have to seek legal remedies which are costly and time consuming, and always risky on whether there will be a chance to ever collect. After all, the events of last week have shown that Hanjin is not a systemically important company to the Korean economy, there is little the Korean constituents that can lose, there is little left for Hanjin’s management and shareholders to lose. Heads I win, tail you lose.

A case of moral hazard of the highest caliber.


A better edited version of this article was originally published on The Maritime Executive website on September 6th, 2016 under the title ‘Moral Hazard Case Study: Hanjin Shipping’.  This article builds on our essay on the dangers of the moral hazard in a weak freight market posted in early September in this post, when market participants were left with few options and little to lose, so much so that they care little for the outcome or the interests other constituents of the shipping industry.


© 2013 – present Basil M Karatzas & Karatzas Marine Advisors & Co.  All Rights Reserved.

IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER:  Access to this blog signifies the reader’s irrevocable acceptance of this disclaimer. No part of this blog can be reproduced by any means and under any circumstances, whatsoever, in whole or in part, without proper attribution or the consent of the copyright and trademark holders of this website. Whilst every effort has been made to ensure that information here within has been received from sources believed to be reliable and such information is believed to be accurate at the time of publishing, no warranties or assurances whatsoever are made in reference to accuracy or completeness of said information, and no liability whatsoever will be accepted for taking or failing to take any action upon any information contained in any part of this website.  Thank you for the consideration.

Hanjin Shipping in Receivership

On August 31st, 2016, Hanjin Shipping filed a receivership petition with Seoul’s Central District Court, and on September 6th, for Chapter 15 protection at US Federal Bankruptcy Court in Newark, NJ. Filings in approximately 45 jurisdictions worldwide, where Hanjin vessels trade, are expected to be filed in the very near term.

mv-hanjin-monaco-5

Containership MV ‘Hanjin Monaco’ against the downtown Manhattan skyline in better days. Image credit: Karatzas Images.

With approximately 140 vessels under management, only 40 of which are self-owned and 100 chartered-in or leased, there have been serious implications for the market, at least in the short term. With only US$ 700 mil in equity, US$ 1.7 billion value of its fleet and $5.4 billion in outstanding obligations, the capital structure resembles a house of cards. The value of the cargo on-board of Hanjin’s vessels at the time of filing for receivership was estimated at $14.5 billion. The ensuing result has been a logistical nightmare, given all such cargo had contractual obligations to be delivered on time, but Hanjin’s vendors would not render any services unless they were getting paid in advance. Receivership and Chapter 15 can stop creditors from knocking on the door, but vendors would now perform only on cash basis payments. Hanjin’s financial nightmare has been compounded by the legal complexity of the business which is further compounded by the logistical complexity of the containership liner business. Only the fact that the containership market has appr. 25% capacity (which has caused Hanjin’s financial troubles in the first place) can alleviate concerns that Hanjin’s potential demise will no be a threat to the supply chain and international trade.

Hanjin’s filing has been front page news for the whole last week. Here’s a list of articles in the print, TV and radio coverage where Basil M Karatzas and Karatzas Marine Advisors & Co were quoted:

Moral Hazard Case Study: Hanjin Shipping                                                          Maritime Executive, September 6th 2016

Containers Stranded at Sea After South Korean Company Goes Bankrupt         NPR, All Things Considered, September 8th, 2016                                                    To Listen to the Audio Clip, Please Click here!  

Retailers Seek U.S Help With Shipping Crisis                                                            The Wall Street Journal, September 1st, 2016

Hanjin Shipping Bankruptcy Unlikely to Ease Gluts of Vessels                                    The Wall Street Journal, September 2nd, 2016

Shipping Chaos                                                                                                              The Exchange CBC News Canadian Broadcasting Corporation                                TV Interview, September 2nd, 2016

screen-shot-2016-09-03-at-3-43-57-pm

Basil Karatzas on CBC News – The Exchange about Hanjin Shipping’s Receivership. Image credit: CBC

© 2013 – present Basil M Karatzas & Karatzas Marine Advisors & Co.  All Rights Reserved.

IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER:  Access to this blog signifies the reader’s irrevocable acceptance of this disclaimer. No part of this blog can be reproduced by any means and under any circumstances, whatsoever, in whole or in part, without proper attribution or the consent of the copyright and trademark holders of this website. Whilst every effort has been made to ensure that information here within has been received from sources believed to be reliable and such information is believed to be accurate at the time of publishing, no warranties or assurances whatsoever are made in reference to accuracy or completeness of said information, and no liability whatsoever will be accepted for taking or failing to take any action upon any information contained in any part of this website.  Thank you for the consideration.

 

Save

Save

Save

Save

Save

The International Handbook of Shipping Finance

We are excited about the autumn publication of the new, authoritative handbook on shipping finance, The International Handbook of Shipping Finance, edited by Professors Manolis G. Kavussanos & Ilias D. Visvikis, and written by a series of authors with outstanding careers at the frontlines of the maritime industry and shipping finance.

Shipping Finance is a unique segment of finance in practice, given the special nature of the field, at the interface of the maritime industry, the finance and banking industry, and trade, fiscal and monetary policies. Shipping is a capital intense industry, and successful shipowners are often defined by their access to competitively priced cost of capital, and likely, the more plentiful and cheaper the capital, the great the success story – as long as risk management practices are grounded to industry fundamentals and accommodate the well-documented high volatility nature through the business cycles. Financial leverage, and financing in shipping, can be achieved in several forms from plain financial leases to operational leases to structured financing to asset backed lending, via export credit and project finance, through the capital and public markets. Shipping finance had traditionally been obtained based on the quality of the collateral (asset backed financing and first preferred ship mortgages), but both the banking-crisis-post-2008 and the evolvement of the maritime markets have necessitated a deeper understanding of the field. Expertise in the shipping markets (operating and managing ships) now has to be tantamount to the expertise of mastering and optimizing financial performance.

In our daily way of business, we are often approached by young people or new investors  and financiers to shipping asking “Where we can learn more about shipping finance”. Besides recommending (of course!) following our blog (Shipping Finance by Karatzas Marine), we can now heartily recommend The International Handbook of Shipping Finance, as a first port call for someone to get a ground foundation of the maritime industry and shipping finance. Written by practitioners in the field, the book offers more than just academic theory as it delves into the detail of ‘how actually is done’. Masterly edited by well-known Professors of shipping finance, Professors Manolis G. Kavussanos (presently Professor at Athens University of Economics and Business (AUEB) & Ilias D. Visvikis (presently Professor at the World Maritime University (WMU) in Malmö, Sweden), this handbook of shipping finance will serve well future generations of students, new investors, but mostly, we want to think, existing shipowners who now, with many shipping banks closed, will feel the need to getting a deeper understanding of shipping finance.

Basil M Karatzas and Karatzas Marine Advisors & Co have been honored to have been invited to contribute a chapter for The International Handbook of Shipping Finance, on the subject of shipping bonds: ‘Public Debt Markets for Shipping’, Chapter 6 of the book.

On a sampling basis, additional contributors to the book are (in alphabetical order): Stefan Albertijn, with HAMANT Beratungs-und Investitions GmbH, Dimitris Anagnostoulos with Aegean Baltic Bank (ABB), Henriette Brent Petersen with DVB Bank SE, Wolfgang Drobetz with the University of Hamburg, Fotis Giannakoulis of Morgan Stanley, Jan-Henrik Huebner with DNV GL, George Paleokrassas with Watson Farley & Williams, Jeffrey Pribor, with Jefferies LLC, and Manish Singh with V.Group Limited.


The International Handbook of Shipping Finance is a one-stop resource, offering comprehensive reference to theory and practice in the area of shipping finance. In the multi-billion dollar international shipping industry, it is important to understand the various issues involved in the finance of the sector. This involves the identification and evaluation of the alternative sources of capital available for financing the ships, including the appraisal and budgeting of shipping investment projects; legal and insurance aspects of ship finance; the financial analysis and modelling of investment projects; mergers and acquisitions; and the commercial and market risk management issues involved.

Technical where appropriate, but grounded in market reality, this is a “must-have” reference for anyone involved in shipping finance, from bank practitioners and commodity trading houses, to ship-brokers, lawyers and insurance houses as well as to university students studying shipping finance.

Flyer - The International Handbook of Shipping Finance JUL2016_Page_1

The International Handbook of Shipping Finance. An exciting book to read in a swiftly changing shipping finance environment!

THE INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF SHIPPING FINANCE
Edited by Professors Manolis G. Kavussanos & Ilias D. Visvikis

Flyer – The International Handbook of Shipping Finance JUL2016


© 2013 – present Basil M Karatzas & Karatzas Marine Advisors & Co.  All Rights Reserved.

IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER:  Access to this blog signifies the reader’s irrevocable acceptance of this disclaimer. No part of this blog can be reproduced by any means and under any circumstances, whatsoever, in whole or in part, without proper attribution or the consent of the copyright and trademark holders of this website. Whilst every effort has been made to ensure that information here within has been received from sources believed to be reliable and such information is believed to be accurate at the time of publishing, no warranties or assurances whatsoever are made in reference to accuracy or completeness of said information, and no liability whatsoever will be accepted for taking or failing to take any action upon any information contained in any part of this website.  Thank you for the consideration.

Save

Save

Save

Save

Save

Save

Karatzas Marine Presentation at 1st MareForum Shipping Conference, Panama City

Conference host and Market Research MareForum has hosted their 1st MareForum Shipping Conference in Panama City on June 24th, 2016, just two days before the official inauguration of the expanded Panama Canal. Basil M Karatzas has been honored to participate and present at the MareForum conference on shipping finance and the investment opportunities present in the industry, titled ‘An Anemic State of Shipping, A Plethora of Opportunities’. The presentation can  be accessed by clicking on the image of the Bridge of the Americas herebelow. Images from strolling Panama City and from the celebrations of the Panama Canal opening celebrations.

Panama Puente de las Americas BMK_0479 @

Bridge of the Americas (Puente de las Americas) straddling the Panama Canal by Balboa and the entrance to the Pacific Ocean. Image credit: Karatzas Images.

Varela_Panama_The Great Connection JUN2016

His Excellency, The President of the Republic of Panama Mr Juan Carlos Varela Rodríguez at the Presentation Oficial del Canal Ampliado (ATLAPA). Image credit: Karatzas Images

Karatzas & Varela Rodriguez IMG_4537

His Excellency, The President of the Republic of Panama Mr Juan Carlos Varela Rodríguez with Karatzas Marine Advisors & Co CEO, Mr Basil M Karatzas. Image credit: Karatzas Images.

© 2013 – present Basil M Karatzas & Karatzas Marine Advisors & Co.  All Rights Reserved.

IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER:  Access to this blog signifies the reader’s irrevocable acceptance of this disclaimer. No part of this blog can be reproduced by any means and under any circumstances, whatsoever, in whole or in part, without proper attribution or the consent of the copyright and trademark holders of this website. Whilst every effort has been made to ensure that information here within has been received from sources believed to be reliable and such information is believed to be accurate at the time of publishing, no warranties or assurances whatsoever are made in reference to accuracy or completeness of said information, and no liability whatsoever will be accepted for taking or failing to take any action upon any information contained in any part of this website.  Thank you for the consideration.

Presentation_1st Panama MAREFORUM_Karatzas F JUN2016

Save

Save

Save

Save