Issuing Shares, yet Another Way to Loosen the Shipping Finance Conundrum

While most of the debate in shipping is focused on any recovery of the freight markets, the small world of shipping finance keeps living one day at a time, one long day after another that is. Freight markets have been moving up and down in the last year, and so have done shipping asset prices; however, for shipping finance, most of the news has been disheartening for the ship owners.

Shipping banks keep divesting of their shipping portfolios, whether those are consisting of bad or good loans. To the extent that certain shipping banks are still viewing the shipping industry as a “core” industry, a handful of big players – who check all the boxes for compliance, regulatory, strategy and value – soak up quickly any liquidity, leaving most of the remaining market as “un-bankable”.  Private equity investors have lost most of their faith in shipping by now, and the alternative funds that have been angling for a lending spot under the shipping sun, are getting ever demanding with each passing day.

The IPO market for shipping has been dead given the uncertainty with the freight market and the prospects of a recovery; and, the much advertised Mergers & Acquisitions (M&A) (a.k.a consolidation) wave has been surgically applicable. In the liner business, where there is ample reason for consolidation (latest example of OOCL’s acquisition by Cosco) there has been more hope, while in the dry bulk sector, a fragmented market is the preferred way of doing business for the foreseeable future.

There have been, however, a few recent transactions in the M&A front in the tanker and dry bulk sectors that had gotten attention to the extent that the sellers opted to accept payment in cash and shares (in the buyers’ business or in the new business entity formed).  The newsworthy point is that shares have been used as currency in order to make the deals happen in the first place, and also in a manner that could allow for more value creation for both the buyer and the seller if there is a market recovery.

Lower Manhattan and Financial District (FiDi) skyline, home to many shipping financiers and shipping finance companies. Image credit: Karatzas Images

A few cases in point: a few months ago, Golden Ocean acquired Quintana by assumption of debt and by issuing of shares valued at appr. $110 mil. to the seller. Hard cash is a valuable commodity for most shipowners these days, and thus the lack of transaction activity in the market to a certain extent; the purchase of Quintana by issuing shares (or “paper”, in the investment lingo), had been the key to the transaction, a key that only publicly listed companies hold. The Quintana shareholders exchanged their stock of a privately held company (Quintana) for shares in a publicly listed company (Golden Ocean); seeing through the transaction, in a circumventional way, Quintana accomplished their long aspired goal of going public; in this case, not by having an IPO but by selling to an already listed company. In a similar way, earlier this year, the BW Group sold their VLCC business to DHT for appr. $540 mil, $260 mil of which were in the form of newly issued DHT shares.  Again, it had been rumored for a while that the BW Group had explored the IPO venue for a public listing; however, a sale for cash and shares partially accomplished the goal of a public company, allowing not only for liquidity for the BW Group shareholders but also preserving for all the equity benefits, especially those emanating from a recovering and booming (VLCC) market.  Also, in a weak tanker market, Tanker Investment Limited (TIL) – a purpose-set public company sponsored by Teekay and private equity funds to exploit tanker asset appreciation, was folded into one of the Teekay companies (Teekay Tankers) in exchange of shares payable to the institutional investors, while Navig8’s aspirations for a monstrous IPO in the tanker space had to materialize in the form of a sale and payment in shares to Scorpio Tankers.

Issuing shares for the acquisition of assets or companies is standard procedure in the M&A world. By issuing shares, the buyer can lessen the burden of taking on too much debt and jeopardizing the transaction and the overall outcome of the transaction by overleveraging. For the seller, accepting, at least partial payment, in shares provides for a better alignment of interests and ensures that they will work hard to see the transaction through; also, it indicates that the seller has faith in the buyer and the market and that they take a position to benefit from an improving market.  Quite frankly, none of the four transactions above would had happened if the buyer was not able to issue shares, and vice versa, none of these transactions would had happened if the seller was not agreeable to a partial payment in shares. And, in our opinion, all these transactions happened since payment in shares was the closest the sellers would have gotten to obtaining liquidity and/or public status, given the IPO market is closed shut at present.

Issuing new shares and paying in shares is a distinct benefit of being a public company. Privately held companies (shipowners) have to pay in hard cash for any acquisitions but publicly traded companies can offer their shares as currency, too. Of course, paying in shares is not always indicated (such as when the shares trade below NAV), and not always the buyer is prepared to accept payment (total or partial) in shares – among other considerations, the shares have to have some “value”. In a world that’s getting trickier for shipping finance, for a shipping company to have the luxury to issue shares and transact with own shares is a distinct advantage that publicly listed companies have over the privately held ones.

Too bad that many of the shipping IPOs of the last decade have degenerated into “penny stocks” with their shares of little or no value that no-one would accept as payment. Too bad that quite a few of the shipping IPOs of the last decade were no more than quick “cash grabs” that have deprived their shareholders of the optionality to presently be able to thrive when the market and competition is stuck in the low shipping finance lane.

Paying in shares is not panacea and it has both practical and financial, and also regulatory, limitations. Once again, in a world where shipping finance is in a bind, shipowners are  compelled to explore every option, and payment in shares is fair game. Actually, there may also be cases where the envelope seems to be pushed to the limit: in its latest announcement, Nordic American Tankers (NAT) announced that payment of the company’s 80th consecutive dividend will be paid in cash and in … shares of another company, Nordic American Offshore (NAO), a daughter company of NAT in the offshore space where the prospects have not played out very well so far.

The “sharing economy” seems to get a completely different meaning for the shipping industry.

Lower Manhattan and Financial District skyline, the World Trade Center and the Upper New York Harbor with its busy shipping traffic lanes…where money and shipping meet. Image credit: Karatzas Images


A version of this posting was first published on the shipping portal Splash 24/7 on August 14th, 2017 under the heading: “Issuing shares helps loosen the shipping finance conundrum”.


© 2013 – present Basil M Karatzas & Karatzas Marine Advisors & Co.  All Rights Reserved.

IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER:  Access to this blog signifies the reader’s irrevocable acceptance of this disclaimer. No part of this blog can be reproduced by any means and under any circumstances, whatsoever, in whole or in part, without proper attribution or the consent of the copyright and trademark holders of this website. Whilst every effort has been made to ensure that information here within has been received from sources believed to be reliable and such information is believed to be accurate at the time of publishing, no warranties or assurances whatsoever are made in reference to accuracy or completeness of said information, and no liability whatsoever will be accepted for taking or failing to take any action upon any information contained in any part of this website.  Thank you for the consideration.

Save

Save

Advertisements

Basil M Karatzas and Karatzas Marine Advisors Quoted in the News

We are delighted that Karatzas Marine Advisors & Co., and its founder Basil M Karatzas have become the contact to have for shipping market expertise; with prompt access to market information and a vast network and access to senior executives worldwide, in the shipping industry and several complimentary industries, the company has had a front row seat to today’s developments in the maritime industry and has been enjoying an active deal-flow and the trust of many in the shipping industry.

Five shipping and logistics influencers you should follow (Veconinter, March 13th, 2017)                                                                                                                            Basil Karatzas was named one of the shipping industry’s influencers by Veconinter, a Venezuela-based logistics company; tweets on shipping, and everything about it, by Basil Karatzas can be followed at @KaratzasMarine and @BasilKaratzas

Πήρε «φωτιά» η αγορά πλοίων μεσαίου τύπου για ξηρό φορτίο (Ναυτεμπορικἠ, March 14th, 2017)

ZIM Shipping Names New CEO in Face of Possible Sale (The Wall Street Journal, March 10th, 2017)

Gibraltar Shipping Interview: Basil Karatzas Talks Alternative Bunkers, S&P Markets, Vessel Financing, and Trump by Gibraltar Shipping (March 10th, 2016)

Ναυπηγήσεις – διαλύσεις, διπλή πρόκληση για τα bulk carriers (Ναυτεμπορικἠ, March 6th, 2017)

Still at sea Shipping’s blues: The many barriers to scrapping cargo ships (The Economist, March 2nd, 2017)

Σε «bad bank» το 5% του παγκόσμιου στόλου των containerships (Ναυτεμπορικἠ, February 15th, 2017)

Sinking Feeling: Shipping Is Latest European Banking Worry (The Wall Street Journal, February 10th, 2017)

From the crossroads to the world… Image credit: Karatzas Images

© 2013 – present Basil M Karatzas & Karatzas Marine Advisors & Co.  All Rights Reserved.

IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER:  Access to this blog signifies the reader’s irrevocable acceptance of this disclaimer. No part of this blog can be reproduced by any means and under any circumstances, whatsoever, in whole or in part, without proper attribution or the consent of the copyright and trademark holders of this website. Whilst every effort has been made to ensure that information here within has been received from sources believed to be reliable and such information is believed to be accurate at the time of publishing, no warranties or assurances whatsoever are made in reference to accuracy or completeness of said information, and no liability whatsoever will be accepted for taking or failing to take any action upon any information contained in any part of this website.  Thank you for the consideration.

2017 03MAR07 N Ναυπηγησεις-διαλυσεις, διπλη προκληση για τα bulker carriers

Shipping industry’s “Neither a borrower nor a lender be”

2016 for the most part has been a difficult year for every sector in the shipping industry: weak rates for dry bulk, containerships, offshore and even tanker vessels exacerbated the financial distress for many owners and their lenders. Recently however the market has shown signs of hope, here and there, with freight rate and asset price improvements, but in general, the greatest hope of all has been that the worst days in shipping, likely, are behind us.

Great name for a bank by the water, but regrettably no shipping loans offered. Image credit: Karatzas Images

One driver in shipping that has not shown any signs of promise are shipping banks in terms of expanding their book in the industry. The market collapse since 2008 has been especially hard for the shipping banks which first saw their clients (shipowners) facing a weak freight market and rendering them unable to sustain the original ship mortgage payments, and then, a precipitous decline in the value of the assets (ships pledged as collateral for the ship mortgages) killed any motivation to keep making payment on underwater assets. Most shipping banks are in an expressed course of departing from shipping and actively have been selling their existing shipping loans for the last several years. The news of certain shipping banks turning their backs to the industry is challenging, but the more disheartening prospect has been that shipping banks still dedicated to shipping have not been able to adapt their models for the current market developments; probably because of the fact that they have to act within strict regulatory and auditing guidelines, shipping banks still active in shipping have been maintaining an almost religious focus on a handful of clients who seem to ‘check all the boxes’, while the vast majority of the market remains un-serviced.

As we had mentioned in the past, the funding gap left in the wake of shipping banks has provided opportunities for institutional investors to enter the ship lending market. Whether these funds are categorized as credit funds or lending funds or alternative capital funds or even disguised as leasing funds on occasion, effectively they are providing capital to the industry in the form of debt, as supposed to equity, and effectively in a sense are substituting for the role of a bank as a lender. On the surface of it, shipping is a capital intensive industry and someone, sooner or later, would had to step in to fill the gap left by the banks.

Credit funds, being institutional investors, have by default higher cost of capital than the funding cost of a bank (read customer deposits), and therefore one would expect that obtaining debt from a fund would have to be at a higher cost. And, indeed, debt financing from a fund typically starts in the low double-digits, all in, even for relatively conservative projects. In a sense, it’s unfortunate that credit funds cannot adjust downwards (below their threshold) the cost of debt of a project depending on risk, since their investors (LPs) have been assured of a certain minimum return, typically in the high single digits after expenses and fees. As expensive the cost of debt financing from credit funds as it may sound, one has to compare it not to what shipowners were accustomed to (and possibly spoiled by indulging shipping banks) a few years ago of a couple of hundred basis points (bps) above Libor (L), but to the real risk of the industry overall and the intricacies of the transaction in particular. If risk can accurately be described by variance and volatility, what risk a rational investor would assign to the dry bulk market when the BDI has varied between almost 13,000 and 300 points in a decade, or when the BDI has varied between 300 and 1,300 points in timeframe shorter of a calendar year?

In need of capital… ‘Ships in a Harbor’, ca 1873, Oil on canvas, Claude Monet; Denman Waldo Ross Collection (1906); Boston Museum of Fine Arts. Image credit: Karatzas Images

As expensive the cost of debt from a credit fund as it may sound, it’s still a relatively low return given that institutional investors typically aim at returns in excess of 20% by taking (mostly market) risk. In a sense, it begs the question why institutional investors would bother with debt investments in shipping. Probably, there are several answers to that: many private equity funds entered shipping aggressively in the last few years and their equity investments have shown a misunderstood industry and its risks; debt investments, on the other hand, either by the same institutional investors or funds who were browsing the industry, is a more measured undertaking of risk, in an industry notoriously volatile. Further, the state of the shipping industry has been so bad that shipowners these days casually consent to high debt financing given the alternative, or lack thereof. Thus, market conditions have pushed shipowners to modify their financing cost expectations and move from bank-related debt financing and closer to fund-related debt financing. And, last but not least, let’s not forget that we are living in an usually low interest rate environment where investors are starved for yield and returns from credit investments in shipping can be acceptable given the interest rate environment.

Depending on how one counts this, more than $5 billion have been committed to credit funds and platforms by institutional investors in the last three years. The mandate of some of these platforms includes investments in shipping loans in the secondary market (not just originations); and, discouragingly enough, some of these credit funds are not completely realistic in their expectations, so we hold doubts on whether their capital can be deployed (still, we cannot get over a really nice ad in the Financial Times a few years ago for a fund having just raised $1 billion to invest in distress, including shipping; they managed to deploy exactly zero dollars in the shipping industry so far, and their in-house shipping guru departed for balmier seas). And coincidentally, $5 billion is still a minuscule amount of money for the debt needs of the shipping industry given that the market of shipping loans stood at more than $700 billion at the top of the market a few years ago. Credit funds will not be able to fill the gap left behind by the banks, but again, that’s not their main mandate or concern.

Can credit funds be considered a strategic partner to the shipping industry? Probably a hard question to answer given that credit funds are still driven by institutional investors who are industry agnostic and tend to gravitate to industries / sectors / geographies in distress, and will not be able to accommodate shipping over the long term. But, for time being and for as long as credit funds are active in shipping, their relatively high cost of capital and their more conservative approach (than equity funds of recent or shipping banks of the last decade), one can be assured that shipping asset prices or newbuilding ordering will not get out of hand, as it has happened twice in the past decade. Credit funds may not be suitable for establishing ‘ceilings’ in the shipping industry but mostly to provide ‘floors’ and holding the market from dropping lower.


© 2013 – present Basil M Karatzas & Karatzas Marine Advisors & Co.  All Rights Reserved.

IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER:  Access to this blog signifies the reader’s irrevocable acceptance of this disclaimer. No part of this blog can be reproduced by any means and under any circumstances, whatsoever, in whole or in part, without proper attribution or the consent of the copyright and trademark holders of this website. Whilst every effort has been made to ensure that information here within has been received from sources believed to be reliable and such information is believed to be accurate at the time of publishing, no warranties or assurances whatsoever are made in reference to accuracy or completeness of said information, and no liability whatsoever will be accepted for taking or failing to take any action upon any information contained in any part of this website.  Thank you for the consideration.

Good Old Days for Shipping

The dry bulk freight market has put an impressive performance of late; the Baltic Dry Index (BDI) has tripled since reaching bottom in February. Now, dry bulkers are in cashflow positive territory, sufficient to cover daily operating expenses (OpEx) and, partially, the financial cost. On the other hand, for tankers, it’s a different story, as tanker freight rates have dropped significantly with primarily shale oil being the game changer; but still, in cash flow positive territory.

On the sale & purchase front, there has been strong demand by buyers for bulker vessels; demand for tankers has been lackluster on the other hand. Prices for bulkers have improved in the last several months by as much as 30% for certain types of vessels. Prices for tankers, on the other hand, have been softening. All along, shipping finance is getting ever more difficult to source; and more expensive.

mv-panangia-tinou-4-bmk_9135

A listing ship and a church. Probably a good reflection of shipping today: lots of troubles and prayers in the same port… Image credit: Karatzas Images

Buying interest for vessels earlier this year had been dominated by a handful of big players who either had raised funds or had their own deep pockets to depend on. Such buyers have bought most of the quality, modern expensive (in absolute terms) ships that owners were forced to sell when the market was abysmal and cash flows were negative. Now, we see a great deal of buying interest from smaller shipowner who have to depend on expensive financing to acquire vessels and who actually will have to stretch themselves for acquisitions, even for still cheap at today’s prices – by historical levels. We have seen buyers putting all the resources together tightly to buy one or two vessels but with little cash reserves on the side for a rainy day. These are the typical speculative buyers who try to time the market by buying low and selling high, and who trade their vessels on the spot market in the interim.

If one were to ‘grade’ buying interest, the strong buying interest at present is definitely of low quality. Earlier in the year, there were substantial buyers with deep pockets buying several sistership vessels or fleets of vessels. Now, small players with no strategic or competitive advantage, with thin pockets and lots of dependence on luck and circumstance are looking to buy a cheap vessel here or a cheap vessel there. Now that freight rates have been improving and the market seems to breathe again some sign of life, they all rush to ride the wave. For bulkers it’s a ‘buy’ mode, but for tankers it’s a ‘stay away’ mode as in the latter market rates have going south and the momentum has been evaporating. All in all, a highly speculative approach to the shipping market, especially by the weaker hands who borrow expensively and they bet that the market will turn around sooner than their short runway will disappear.

We view with concern the recent resurgence of buying interest in the dry bulk market and the flip side, the absence of interest for the tanker market. Buying interest is not driven by access to cargoes or fundamental analysis of stronger demand; it’s mostly predicated on the fact that dry bulk vessels are cheap and the freight market is improving, at least in the short term. Pure speculation without much analysis; honestly, we are not the ones to judge on that, if that’s how one wishes to apply a market model. On the other hand, speculation has brought much of the present tonnage oversupply from owners who were ordering them to shipyards that were building them to shipping banks that were financing them.

Having experienced a cashflow negative market for almost two years which saw many shipowners burn their cash to survive or seen their vessels ‘re-allocated’ by the banks, the amount of speculative action in the market is scary. We appreciate that shipping and volatility (and speculation) go hand-in-hand, but one would had thought that two years of bleeding should had taught a lesson or two.

A sign of froth in the stock market is when small investors get all their little savings together and step to open a brokerage account and try to participate in a rally, buying odd lots of shares, and trying to ride the tail of the wave. It’s interpreted that when weak hands get the itch for speculation and getting sucked in, it’s when one knows that there is little more money to be pulled into the vortex.

We are all for entrepreneurship and active capitalism, but buy because ‘ships are cheap and the market will recover’ is not always the best business plan. Typically assets that are out-of-favor will again be back in favor, no doubt, but there is more to the story in order to make money by other than just speculating. Otherwise, it seems a sucker’s game.


This article was first published on the Seatrade Maritime News under the title: “Is it really the right time to buy ships?” on November 28, 2016. We’d like to thank them for their finding it worth publishing on their esteemed website!

© 2013 – present Basil M Karatzas & Karatzas Marine Advisors & Co.  All Rights Reserved.


IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER:  Access to this blog signifies the reader’s irrevocable acceptance of this disclaimer. No part of this blog can be reproduced by any means and under any circumstances, whatsoever, in whole or in part, without proper attribution or the consent of the copyright and trademark holders of this website. Whilst every effort has been made to ensure that information here within has been received from sources believed to be reliable and such information is believed to be accurate at the time of publishing, no warranties or assurances whatsoever are made in reference to accuracy or completeness of said information, and no liability whatsoever will be accepted for taking or failing to take any action upon any information contained in any part of this website.  Thank you for the consideration.

Basil M Karatzas and Karatzas Marine Advisors Quoted in the News

The shipping industry has been maintaining a very active profile in the mainstream international business press. Major bankruptcies, reorganizations, merges, vessel arrests and auctions are daily routine these days. Shipping banks, shipping loans actively and non performing loans (NPL) along with provisions are of concern or interest to many.  And, the  freight market that keeps surprising in terms of volatility.

We are delighted that Karatzas Marine Advisors & Co., and its founder Basil M Karatzas have become the contact to have for shipping market expertise; with prompt access to market information and a vast network and access to senior executives worldwide, in the shipping industry and several complimentary industries, the company has had a front row seat to today’s developments in the maritime industry and has been enjoying an active deal-flow and the trust of many in the shipping industry.

Dry-Bulk Shipping Owners Get Reprieve as Rates Rebound
(Wall Street Journal, November 24, 2016)

What Will Save the Shipping Industry? Eight Industry Thoughts Leaders Weigh In   (LLoyd’s List, November 17, 2016)

Taiwan Approves $1.9 Billion Aid Package to Troubled Shipping Companies
(Wall Street Journal, November 16, 2016)

Varsler shippinghavari (translated as ‘Warning Signs for Shipping’)
Dagens Næringsliv, (November 11, 2016 – In Norwegian)

Τα απόνερα από την εκλογή Τραμπ
(Η Ναυτεμπορικἠ, November 10, 2016 – In Greek)

Israel’s Zim Looking to Sell Most Global Shipping Operations
(Wall Street Journal, November 4, 2016)

Japan’s Largest Shipping Firms to Merge Container Operations
(Wall Street Journal, October 31, 2016)

Offen Group Selling Two MR Tankers
(Lloyd’s List, October 25, 2016)

Pressure on German shipping lenders unlikely to ease
(The Financial Times, September 21, 2016)

Guest Voices: Shipping Banks Face Sinking Prospects as They Postpone Reckoning
(Wall Street Journal, September 19, 2016)

It’s not over – Shipping industry adapting to difficult times
(Wärtsilä, September 12, 2016)

Shipping industry not buoyed by low fuel costs
(The Cayman Islands Journal, June 1, 2016)

mv-king-basil-10-bmk_2987

Aptly named containership vessel MV ‘King Basil’ departing the port of Piraeus. Image credit: Karatzas Images

© 2013 – present Basil M Karatzas & Karatzas Marine Advisors & Co.  All Rights Reserved.

IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER:  Access to this blog signifies the reader’s irrevocable acceptance of this disclaimer. No part of this blog can be reproduced by any means and under any circumstances, whatsoever, in whole or in part, without proper attribution or the consent of the copyright and trademark holders of this website. Whilst every effort has been made to ensure that information here within has been received from sources believed to be reliable and such information is believed to be accurate at the time of publishing, no warranties or assurances whatsoever are made in reference to accuracy or completeness of said information, and no liability whatsoever will be accepted for taking or failing to take any action upon any information contained in any part of this website.  Thank you for the consideration.

2016-11nov10-naftemporiki-%cf%84%ce%b1-%ce%b1%cf%80%ce%bf%ce%bd%ce%b5%cf%81%ce%b1-%ce%b1%cf%80%ce%bf-%cf%84%ce%b7%ce%bd-%ce%b5%ce%ba%ce%bb%ce%bf%ce%b3%ce%b7-%cf%84%cf%81%ce%b1%ce%bc

Hanjin’s History Lessons

‘Time is the longest distance between two places’ concludes the Tennessee Williams’ character at the end of the play The Glass Menagerie. For a large number of creditors, vendors, tonnage providers, and predominantly shippers – with $14 billion worth of merchandise packed in containers onboard Hanjin ships, this philological expression was a very hard lesson to put to practice when the company filed for receivership at the end of August.  At present, and with everything going well, the best estimate is that Hanjin’s vessels will be unloaded by the end of October. A very long time indeed for shipping containers ‘lost’ between ports at today’s age.

hanjin-monaco-manhattan-aug2014-dsc_6095

In better days… Image credit: Karatzas Images

The developments with Hanjin are still work-in-progress that may take several months, if not years, to settle permanently. For now, it’s a logistical nightmare bordering a legal saga that, in turn, stands on the periphery of the self-feeding financial crisis. Each one of these three parallel worlds will have to run their own course and trajectory, but again, not too far apart from each other. Definitely many lessons beg be learned once all is said and done, and the containers get delivered and the bills get paid, eventually. The fact that Hanjin Shipping has been the largest containership liner company bankruptcy ever (the second biggest was that of the United States Lines in 1986, when the boxship world was still in its infancy) will provide plenty of lessons on where the ‘stress points’ are in the system and the supply chain, and would provide some insight on whether the containership liner industry is a ‘systemic’ industry to the world’s trade.  There have been numerous financial restructurings and bankruptcies in shipping since the crisis ensued in 2008, but almost all of them were in the dry bulk and tanker sectors, where the logistical head-scratchers were much easier to address: usually there is one charterer or cargo owner per vessel per voyage in the dry bulk and tanker markets and not the plethora of cargoes and shippers and vendors with their boxes onboard a containership.

While it will take time to know the fine detail of the numerous parts interacting together in the liner business, a perfunctory view of the case, based on info available so far, indicates that all the factors one would expect to see in the cause of a default in the shipping industry were present in the Hanjin case.

The company, going after market and trying to keep up with the main players in the market, had effectively became a house of cards in terms of over-leverage, financially and operationally. Almost one hundred vessels (out of the 140 vessels under management) were chartered in, effectively with off-balance sheet, non-recourse financing. When the banks and lenders stop lending when one’s balance sheet gets stretched, an ambitious shipowner can just turn to the charter market and can pile up abundantly on tonnage based on their ‘signature’ and their (unsecured) promise to pay. No more than that is needed. Just a ‘sterling’ name and a ‘first class client’, as the saying goes, can be of enough assurance for charter payments and place a tall house a cards in short order. This was once a big deal even back then in 2008, for those who recall.

And, there were plenty of companies and shipowners who had been just happy to offer their tonnage on long term charters to Hanjin, just to show to their own shareholders and lenders that they had cash flow visibility and they were not speculators. Nice long charters with juicy cash-flows that paid until they stopped, that is. It may be worth asking whether such business practice was the result of poor risk management or just a case when no-one really questions whether the emperor may be naked. ‘If so many other tonnage providers had found Hanjin to be a quality charterer, who am I to stop chartering to them vessels’, one almost may be able to hear in a boardroom discussion.

mv-hanjin-namu-7-bmk_7809

When days were great… Image credit: Karatzas Images

And, Hanjin was not just any charterer. They had real substance since they were a liner company and had access to the end user. If things turned bad for the market, as they did indeed, Hanjin would have cargoes to move and keep the ships busy and therefore keep making the lease and charter-hire payments. They had access to their own terminals (at least partially), and they had preferential access to S. Korea’s promising and export-oriented economy, and thus, they were supposed to have a backstop if things were to get ugly. As we learn now, a bad market is a bad market and it burns cash for stand-alone owners but also burns cash for strategic owners, like Hanjin, too. Notions of an end-user charterer are great, but again, a bad market can pinch sharply enough to make the pain felt on the bone of an end-user.

And, Hanjin was part of a substantial industrial conglomerate with strategic access to the ‘system’, that is the government and the state banks; it had to, as being a chaebol company, they had the implicit ‘put option’ of the government itself. And beautifully this was played until when the cash burn topped US$ 2 million per diem, and all the constituents had to look for alternative solutions. You can support a company-in-need for so long, but again, all love in this world has to have some limits.  And with Hyundai Merchant Marine (HMM), the local competitor, reaching the restructuring altar in the summer first, there were one too many brides afterwards. There are still many more containership and liner companies that could be considered to have a quasi-government guarantee worldwide. Caveat emptor.

As much as we would like to believe that the Hanjin case will be an example to be held, one has to be doubtful. Time and again, defaults happen in shipping with almost metronomic frequency, and all the times, the same old factors drive those shipping companies to the ground, or the bottom of the sea for that matter: aggressiveness, over-leverage, poor risk management, over-reliance on fundamental assumptions that turn out to be fundamentally wrong, and wishful thinking.

But again, if it were not for all these surprises, shipping would be just any other boring industry. One-dimensional with ships floating beautifully over the ocean. Apparently, there is the dimension of time, at least until one gets their container delivered.


The article above was first published on Splash 247 under the heading ‘Hanjin’s Longest Voyage Yet’ on October 17, 2016.


© 2013 – present Basil M Karatzas & Karatzas Marine Advisors & Co.  All Rights Reserved.

IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER:  Access to this blog signifies the reader’s irrevocable acceptance of this disclaimer. No part of this blog can be reproduced by any means and under any circumstances, whatsoever, in whole or in part, without proper attribution or the consent of the copyright and trademark holders of this website. Whilst every effort has been made to ensure that information here within has been received from sources believed to be reliable and such information is believed to be accurate at the time of publishing, no warranties or assurances whatsoever are made in reference to accuracy or completeness of said information, and no liability whatsoever will be accepted for taking or failing to take any action upon any information contained in any part of this website.  Thank you for the consideration.

Moral Hazard and Hanjin Shipping

Not a week has passed since we posted an article on the Maritime Executive’s website about moral hazard in shipping, and the shipping world got a big-proportions, real-life case study of the risks in the industry. We argued that when shipowners are over their heads in debt and with little promise of ever recovering any equity, there is precious little they care about financing, operations, trade, safety and even the environment.

Hanjin Shipping, based in South Korea and world’s seventh biggest containership company, filed for protection in S. Korean courts in late August, and subsequently started filing for protection in several jurisdictions worldwide, including in the United States federal bankruptcy court (filing for Chapter 15 restructuring in Newark, NJ). As of the end of second quarter this year in June, the company had outstanding obligations close to US$ 5.5 billion, approximately US$ 900 million of which due by the end of 2017. There were approximately US$ 700 million in equity on the balance sheet. Hanjin stands as the manager of appr. 142 vessels, 98 of which are containerships and 44 are tankers and bulkers. Only one-fourth of Hanjin’s fleet is self-owned, 38 of them owned and the rest chartered in from leasing companies and other financially-minded shipowners. The ownership mix of the tonnage indicates more of a light-asset, trading company rather an asset-heavy, ship-owning balance sheet. The current value of the owned fleet stands at appr. US$ 1.7 billion.

hanjin-monaco-verrazzano-bridge-aug2014-kma-dsc_6132

Shipping crossing a bridge… Image Credit: Karatzas Images

Many details are still too opaque and covered by bilateral non-disclosure agreements, but where several of the counterparties have been publicly listed companies, one can draw certain conclusions: Hanjin had chartered in two 2010-built capsize vessels from publicly listed Navios Maritime Partners (ticker: NNA) MV ‘Navios Luz’ and MV ‘Navios Buena Ventura’ at a daily rate of US$ 29,356 pd each; the average spot capesize market was barely $6,000 pd during the last year, and presuming that Hanjin was trading the vessels on the spot market, they were losing $23,000 every single day for the last year ; of each of the two vessels. That is $16 mil down the drain for the two vessels in just the last year alone; each of the vessels had more than four years of employment remaining with the shipowner, and presuming that the spot capesize market would remain at present levels, Hanjin would had to suffer another $90 mil in losses for just these two vessels. Eight containerships chartered in from Danaos (ticker: DAC) had charter payment obligations of appr. $565 million. Similarly, three neo-panamax containerships from Seaspan (ticker: SSW) had outstanding charter obligations of close to US$ 370 million. These charter obligations add up to close to US$ 900 million, and under present market conditions, reasonable estimates would be for losses of more than US$ 500 million. And these are the calculations based on publicly available information for only thirteen of the 100+ vessels chartered-in, with only three counterparties. There are un-accounted obligations for more than eighty vessels that have been chartered in from other owners.

$23,000 losses every single day in the last year for each of the two capes chartered from Navios. Talk about destruction of value!

What options such a ‘shipowner’ like Hanjin (effectively a structured house of cards) does have under the circumstances? As one would suspect, very few. There is little in matter of equity, there is little in matter of collateral, there is lots of debt, and mostly, most of the debt is in relatively unsecured position since it’s in the form of charter obligations for the vessels that have been contracted on charter arrangements.

Playing the devil’ advocate and ask surreal but economically oriented questions: How much vested interest the shipowner has in the assets and the business? Precious little, at this stage. What are the odds that they will recover any equity? Probably better than hitting the jackpot in a national lottery, which we all know is not a fair proposition. What would any rational economic being would do? Briefly, either ask for the mercy of their creditors, or, having little to lose, just stop paying the creditors and pass the buck to the other side. What we called moral hazard in the previous posting.

Hanjin had been rumored (along with their co-patriot Hyundai Merchant Marine (HMM)) to be facing financial problems and was an accident waiting to happen. HMM, being slicker, and faster, and part of a big chaebol (traditional corporate conglomerate structure in S. Korea, strongly affiliated with family management style and running businesses deemed strategically important to the State, in exchange of the State’s preferential treatment), managed in August to find their way out of their financial ‘pickle’. When Hanjin tried to secure the consent and more financing from their lenders (mostly Korean banks and the state-owned Korean Development Bank), there was little empathy. This would make perfect sense, as their lenders were in relatively preferred senior position, and any new financing would be considered either ‘throwing good money after bad money’ or diluting their position and getting lower on the seniority scale of claimants. It would make economic sense to refuse any new financing and let the un-secured creditors (that is the shipowners of the hundred vessels on charter to Hanjin, like Navios, Diana, Seaspan) accept a less demanding solution. Again, Hanjin and their prime financiers decided to drop the moral hazard bomb to the parties with a lower legal claim, the shipowners of the vessels.

hanjin-monaco-manhattan-aug2014-dsc_6095

The good times left behind… Image Credit: Karatzas Images

Hanjin Shipping is the seventh containership company in the world but with only appr. 3% market, thus, belonging in the lower tier of containership companies as compared to behemoths like Moeller Maersk, Cosco, MSC and CMA CGM. A default by Hanjin cannot be expected to have a major domino effect on the overall shipping or containership world markets. The majority of Hanjin’s lenders were Korean banks, including the Korean Development Bank (KDB), and the Korean banking system (and the Korean taxpayer, if so required) can absorb the losses without posing a systemic risk to the Korean economy, at least at this stage. Hanjin had been a major carrier for LG electronics, but again, even Hanjin’s demise could not be detrimental to LG and the Korean electronics and manufacturing industries; not to mention, since HMM’s successful restructuring in the summer, now there has been an alternative, an alternative based in Korea itself (subsequent reports state the LG has already been shifting their shipment contracts to HMM). Thus, once the situation was ‘ring fenced’ and a fall-out was determined to be contained, Hanjin and its main creditors stopped paying to the lower standing creditors (other shipowners with charter-in tonnage). An example of moral hazard in all its glory.

Hanjin has filed for restructuring (and not for liquidation) expecting to find a way to save the company as a going concern over the long term. However, owners of vessels on charter to Hanjin, companies like Danaos, Seaspan, Navios and many other smaller, private owners, stand to lose the most. In an oversupplied market of low freight rates, it will be difficult to withdraw their vessels from Hanjin and seek equally profitable charter rates elsewhere in the present market; likely, they will have to accept lower and extended rates that Hanjin will offer them, and possibly some equity upside if and when the company recovers. Otherwise, the shipowners will have to seek legal remedies which are costly and time consuming, and always risky on whether there will be a chance to ever collect. After all, the events of last week have shown that Hanjin is not a systemically important company to the Korean economy, there is little the Korean constituents that can lose, there is little left for Hanjin’s management and shareholders to lose. Heads I win, tail you lose.

A case of moral hazard of the highest caliber.


A better edited version of this article was originally published on The Maritime Executive website on September 6th, 2016 under the title ‘Moral Hazard Case Study: Hanjin Shipping’.  This article builds on our essay on the dangers of the moral hazard in a weak freight market posted in early September in this post, when market participants were left with few options and little to lose, so much so that they care little for the outcome or the interests other constituents of the shipping industry.


© 2013 – present Basil M Karatzas & Karatzas Marine Advisors & Co.  All Rights Reserved.

IMPORTANT DISCLAIMER:  Access to this blog signifies the reader’s irrevocable acceptance of this disclaimer. No part of this blog can be reproduced by any means and under any circumstances, whatsoever, in whole or in part, without proper attribution or the consent of the copyright and trademark holders of this website. Whilst every effort has been made to ensure that information here within has been received from sources believed to be reliable and such information is believed to be accurate at the time of publishing, no warranties or assurances whatsoever are made in reference to accuracy or completeness of said information, and no liability whatsoever will be accepted for taking or failing to take any action upon any information contained in any part of this website.  Thank you for the consideration.